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A COMPARISON OF TRANSPARENCY IN THE DEFENSE 






This study will compare the defense procurement processes of Turkey and Thailand in 
terms of transparency and explore the risk of corruption throughout the defense 
procurement cycle. To analyze the defense procurement process of both countries, the 
researchers will investigate and evaluate the vulnerabilities of the processes by 
considering the main characteristics of each procurement process and the differences 
between both countries. The report will include some examples from defense 
procurement of the United States for improving and solving the problem in transparency. 
Finally, recommendations will be given for Turkish and Thai military to improve their 
transparency in the defense procurement process.  
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Corruption is too often found as a problem in defense procurement. As defense projects 
are usually large and some processes involve tremendous amounts of money and benefits, 
some officials try to find loopholes to take advantage of military projects. However, only 
a few cases are ever investigated because the involved officials commonly hide behind 
the secrecy of national security to protect themselves from inspection. Moreover, there 
are few measurements indicating the level of transparency. Therefore, inefficient 
processes attract dishonest officials and suppliers who intend to exploit the national 
interest. Their actions cause problems of corruption during the defense procurement 
process. This study will also examine existing transparency theories, explain general 
defense procurement process and fraud cases, and compare the defense procurement of 
Thailand and Turkey, in particular, in terms of transparency. 
The definition, measurement, and implementation of transparency theories have 
to be described before analyzing defense procurement. Transparency has to be clarified in 
order to understand the optional tools for evaluating the process, as there are several 
different explanations of transparency. Therefore, this study will use some perspectives 
from Transparency International as a main justification. Transparency International is the 
primary non-governmental organization monitoring corruption in the world. It uses the 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) as a tool. This tool is used to demonstrate the 
perceived level of transparency each country has. As the index shows across-countries 
transparency, it enables us to comprehend the causes and consequences of corruption in 
different countries. Many types of corruption are explained in order to show that 
corruption is a global problem that is difficult to detect. Thus, transparency theories are 
essential for measuring the extent of corruption in the defense procurement process.   
Furthermore, this research uses a case study approach to explain each stage of a 
procurement process and identifies the laws and regulations that are imposed, especially 
in military practice. Since there are many stages in the procurement process, each stage is 
explained in order according to standard practice and international regulations. When 
each stage is explained, the characteristics of the process will be obvious. The most 
 xv 
important characteristic of the defense procurement process that adversely affects 
transparency is “secrecy.” Because national security can be compromised by disclosed 
information, information related to the procurement process is often concealed, which 
makes investigation challenging. The process can be reliably monitored only from an 
external aspect. If there is no internal investigation, however, officials can hide their 
exploitation behind secrecy. This may produce more opportunities for corruption. This 
study specifically focuses on a couple of fraud cases showing problems in transparency 
of procurement in the United States; they are examples of transparent analysis for 
Thailand and Turkey.  
Finally, a comparison of transparency in defense procurements will be conducted 
to indicate similarities and differences between Thailand and Turkey. The problems of 
defense procurement of each country are studied in order to compare and contrast their 
weaknesses and strengths. These analyses reveal different possible causes of corruption. 
Due to the complexity of the defense procurement process, CPI is utilized as the indicator 
of transparency. Reviewing CPI in each topic will help readers clearly interpret the scores 
and ranking of both countries. Although there are some different factors affecting 
transparency in both countries, most causes of corruption arise from the immorality of 
officials and suppliers as well as an inefficient procurement process. Therefore, 
comparison of the processes of both countries helps inspectors more easily identify the 
faults of the system. 
In conclusion, the study examines the defense procurement systems in Thailand 
and Turkey in terms of transparency. Transparency International is consulted to explain 
the transparency of the process. Even though secrecy and complexity are barriers to 
investigating the defense procurement process, some cases indicate that transparency can 
be measured with existing tools, especially the CPI. Comparing CPI scores helps 
inspectors determine the level of transparency of particular countries’ procurement 
processes as well as how different or similar they are in each area. A comparison of the 
procurement processes of Thailand and Turkey reveals faults in their processes and 
identifies improvements that can be implemented to eliminate such defects. As a result, 
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The problem of corruption around the world is widespread and has been getting 
worse for decades, especially in developing countries. According to Shleifer and Vishny 
(1993), “Corruption is both pervasive and significant around the world.” Transparency 
International (TI), a non-governmental organization that has researched worldwide 
corruption for twenty years, has created several indexes to measure corruption, including 
the Corruption Perceptions Index, the Global Corruption Barometer, and the Bribe Payers 
Index. According to the Global Corruption Barometer 2013, most public opinion around 
the world agrees that corruption is a serious problem in the development of their 
countries. Furthermore, Bribe Payers Index 2011 states that the problem of bribery has 
not improved since the index was first publicized in 2008 (Transparency International, 
2013). 
The majority of governments dedicate most of their budget to the defense sector, 
making it the area most vulnerable to corruption. Because of the high value transactions, 
the defense procurement process is vulnerable to corruption (Campos & Pradhan, 2007). 
Defense procurements have complex characteristics, including offset contracts, use of 
procurement agents, and use of the government shield of secrecy. Governments often 
poorly control these unique risks (Government Defense Index, 2013). 
According to the Government Defense Index, in most of countries there is no 
government requirement for companies to ensure that companies and their subcontractors 
employ anti-corruption measures (Government Defense Index, 2013). Almost half of the 
countries do not have procurement oversight mechanisms. Furthermore, contracting 
agents may use the government shield of secrecy and security to remain hidden from 
disclosure. Contracting agents use the unintentional governmental help to protect certain 
records and actions from public release for national security reasons. Currently only a 
few developed countries have effective mechanisms to discover or detect corruption in 
the procurement process. 
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B. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The purpose of this study is to understand and identify the key characteristics of 
defense procurement processes of Thailand and Turkey and to investigate corruption-
related vulnerabilities, gaps, and problematic areas specific to the defense procurement 
cycle. Evaluation of transparency in the defense procurement process will be based on the 
findings of international organizations such as Transparency International and the 
Sunlight Foundation. Applications of transparency in all phases of the acquisition cycle 
of Turkey and Thailand will be compared to understand the key elements that affect 
transparency. Finally, this study will give recommendations about the best applications 
that can detect and prevent corruption in defense procurement. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
• What are the steps of defense procurement process? 
• What are the areas of highest risk involved in the defense procurement 
process? 
• What are the measures the U.S. uses to detect and prevent corruption in 
defense procurement? 
• What is the importance of the military for Turkey? 
• What are the organizations that play an important role in the procurement 
process? 
• What is the civil-military relation in Turkey? 
• What are the efforts for building transparency in Turkey?  
• How influential is the military in Thailand? 
• What are the organizations that play an important role in defense 
procurement? 
• Where are important points in the defense procurement process that can 
cause loopholes? 
• What are problem areas of transparency in Thailand’s defense 
procurement? 
• What are main characteristics of the defense procurement process of 
Turkey and Thailand? 
• What corruption-related vulnerabilities exist in the defense procurement 
cycle? 
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• Which vulnerabilities pose higher risks in the defense procurement cycle? 
• How do existing tools and measures impact corruption vulnerabilities in 
the defense procurement cycle? 
• How transparent are the defense procurement processes of Turkey and 
Thailand? 
• What are the organizations that evaluate the effectiveness of transparency 
in Turkey and Thailand? 
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS 
This study focuses on the transparency of the defense procurement processes of 
Turkey and Thailand. In this study, corruption risks related to the defense procurement 
process will be analyzed and some recommendations will be given in order to build 
transparency in defense procurement. There will be no information on the transparency of 
other public procurement processes not related to national defense.  
E. METHODOLOGY 
This study is limited to analysis of the procurement processes of Turkey and 
Thailand and to a review of sources related to defense procurement and corruption 
vulnerabilities, as well as the measures, tools, mechanisms, and international conventions 
available to detect and prevent corruption. Transparency rules, anti-corruption principles, 
regulations, and laws aimed to provide transparency is used as a main source in this 
study. The information on the effectiveness of current transparency precautions is 
retrieved from the Government Defense Anti-Corruption Index, Transparency 
International, and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).  
F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
This study is comprised of six chapters. 
Chapter I explains this study’s background information, purpose, research 
questions, scope, limitations, assumptions, and methodology. 
Chapter II illustrates the transparency theories applied to the defense procurement 
process and then explains each step of the defense procurement process. The definition of 
and the reasons for corruption are also given in this chapter. This chapter provides the 
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U.S. anti-corruption law and regulations related to the defense procurement process. 
Finally, an important case study, which helps us to realize the importance of transparency 
in defense procurement, is analyzed. 
Chapter III is comprised of the information on the defense procurement process of 
Turkey and on the efforts for transparency building in defense procurement. 
Chapter IV is comprised of the information on the defense procurement process of 
Thailand and on the efforts for transparency building in defense procurement. 
Chapter V compares the differences and similarities between problems resulting 
from the different understanding of transparency in Turkey and Thailand. 
Chapter VI states conclusions of findings in the previous chapters and 







II. OVERVIEW OF TRANSPARENCY IN DEFENSE 
PROCUREMENT 
A. BACKGROUND 
This chapter explores the following research questions:  
• What are the steps of the defense procurement process? 
• What are the areas of highest risk involved in the defense procurement 
process? 
• What are the measures the U.S. government has implemented to detect 
and prevent corruption in defense procurement? 
This chapter will illustrate the history of transparency and the transparency 
theories applied to the defense procurement process. Due to the complexity and time-
intensive nature of the procurement process, the process is vulnerable to corruption 
during the procurement cycle. Basic stages in the procurement process are discussed to 
illustrate how the process can be subject to fraud. Moreover, as the U.S. has significant 
experience in defense procurement, a couple of cases from the U.S. procurement process 
are described in this chapter as examples of transparency in practice. 
1. History of Transparency 
The history of transparency is fairly recent. It is a relatively new term that 
originates as a sociological concern of the late 1700s. The first known transparency 
movement was the Freedom of the Press Act adopted by Sweden in 1766.  
From that time onward, sociologists have analyzed transparency in different areas. 
One famous sociologist, Max Weber, mainly used transparency in explaining social class 
differences and public administration. According to Weber, transparency is the degree of 
willingness of a bureaucratic administration to share knowledge with the public. As 
quoted in Roth and Wittich (1978), Weber wrote: 
Bureaucratic administration always tends to exclude the public, to hide its 
knowledge and action from criticism as well as it can. Bureaucracy 
naturally prefers a poorly informed, and hence powerless, parliament—at 
least insofar as this ignorance is compatible with the bureaucracy’s own 
interests. (p. 992) 
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As humanity expanded, so the meaning of transparency has expanded from its 
original definition. In the modern world, transparency is defined from varied 
perspectives, such as political, economic, and cultural ones. 
A generally accepted definition of transparency is public access to information, or 
in other words, “timely and reliable economic, social and political information accessible 
to all relevant stakeholders” (Kolstad & Wiig, 2009, p. 521). In other words, transparency 
is nothing more than public access to governmental information. In sum, public access to 
governmental information and usability of this information is required for transparency 
(Ginsberg et al., 2012). 
Most recently a new kind of civil organization has arisen to promote an “anti-
corrupt and transparent world.” Two main examples of such an organization are 
Transparency International and The Sunlight Foundation.  
TI defines transparency as “a principle that allows those affected by 
administrative decisions, business transactions or charitable work to know not only the 
basic facts and figures but also the mechanisms and processes. It is the duty of civil 
servants, managers and trustees to act visibly, predictably and understandably” 
(Transparency International, 2013a). 
The Sunlight Foundation utilizes Internet sources to lobby governments for more 
openness and transparency (Sunlight Foundation, 2013a). It identifies ten principles in 
order to assess the availability of government data to public access. These principles are 
“completeness, primacy, timeliness, ease of physical and electronic access, machine 
readability, non-discrimination, use of commonly owned standards, licensing, 
permanence and usage costs” (The Sunlight Foundation, 2013b). 
2. Measures 
A variety of means has been attempted to measure and evaluate transparency. 
Although there is no generally accepted approach, there is a consensus on the difficulty 
of the process. TI uses a Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), which incorporates surveys 
about the perceptions of people and organizations on the subject of corruption and 
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transparency. TI publicizes the CPI score and rankings of countries’ every year. This 
index has a value scale from 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (highly transparent) to show the 
level of perceived corruption in countries, and its ranking from 1 (highly transparent) to 
177 (highly corrupt) illustrates a particular country’s position relative to others.  
Every year, TI announces countries’ transparency points and their ranking among 
177 countries that are being analyzed. Using perception as the basis for evaluation has 
made the index open to criticism. Because of the willfully hidden characteristics of 
corrupted actions, it is not possible to measure transparency directly. Therefore, in 
measuring transparency proxies must be used, which does not always give the same 
results. But according to one study, there is a strong correlation between the CPI and the 
two proxies, black market activity and overabundance of regulation (Wilhelm, 2007). 
Global Integrity, an independent organization that provides annual transparency 
reports, measures transparency with the help of surveys and studies of local researchers, 
journalists, and academics (Global Integrity, 2013). 
In another approach, Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests are used to 
measure transparency. FOIA, a U.S. law, enables the public to access governmental 
information (FOIA, 2013). Some scholars employ the FOIA to measure transparency. For 
example, Justin Fox has focused on how federal agencies have implemented FOIA 
principles in their performance. He also gave importance to how agencies respond to 
information requests and evaluated transparency depending on the requester’s satisfaction 
level (Fox, 2011). 
3. The Problem Areas 
Although transparency is a popular trend, its importance in reducing corruption 
does not get proper attention. It is a generally accepted fact that there is a correlation 
between corruption and lack of transparency. But what is not properly defined and 
applied is how to use transparency to prevent or discover corruption. According to 




• Corruption is less risky and more attractive. 
• It is harder to use incentives to make public officials act cleanly. 
• It is hard to select the most honest and efficient people for public sector 
positions or as contract partners. 
• Cooperation is more difficult to sustain, and opportunistic rent-seeking 
more likely. 
• It is more likely for a government to undermine social norms and reduce 
trust.  
4. Corruption 
To study corruption, we need to review the different definitions of corruption. 
Most of the definitions concentrate on the action of governments or people who have 
authority over national property, such as “the sale by government officials of government 
property for personal gain” (Shleifer & Vishny, 1993). The Oxford English Dictionary 
defines corruption as “dishonest or illegal behavior, especially of people in authority: 
allegations of bribery and corruption.”  
Similarly, TI defines corruption as “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain, 
which eventually hurts everyone who depends on the integrity of people in a position of 
authority” (Transparency International, 2013a). It is obvious that there are two kinds of 
people playing an important role in corruption. One is a government official who has 
authority over government assets or administration, and another is a contractor or vendor 
who benefits from corruption.  
However, although most of the definitions emphasize abuse, some scholars cite 
other behaviors and motivations associated with corruption. Huntington has described 
corruption as the “behavior of public officials, which deviates from accepted norms in 
order to serve private ends.”He argues that some forms of corruption help stimulate 
economic development, especially in situations where there is a rigid administration or 
poor government policy (Huntington, 2006). Leff makes a similar argument (Leff, 2002). 
5. Theory of Corruption 
There are many different forms of corruption. Shleifer and Vishny divide 
government corruption into two categories:  
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First, “corruption without theft” occurs when officials add marginal costs on the 
price of goods. Customers pay more to get certain goods or services from the 
government. Therefore, the government still gets its fee or cost of goods sold, and the 
officials get the marginal cost as a bribe.  
The second case is “corruption with theft.” This is when officials secretly sell 
government goods or services and do not return any proceeds to the government. The 
officials get the price of goods or services as a bribe. As this price is usually lower than 
official price, the demand for corruption with theft is higher than without theft. Thus, the 
corruption with theft spreads more easily because its result meets the interests of both 
officials and buyers (Shleifer & Vishny, 1993). Obviously bribery is mainly a medium 
for corruption in this explanation. The public loses some social benefits, while the parties 
involved in the bribing activities gain instead.   
Transparency International classifies corruption into three main types: grand 
corruption, petty corruption, and political corruption (Transparency International, 2013b), 
which it defines accordingly:  
• Grand corruption “consists of acts committed at a high level of 
government that distort policies or the central functioning of the state, 
enabling leaders to benefit at the expense of the public good” 
• Petty corruption “refers to everyday abuse of entrusted power by low- and 
mid-level public officials in their interactions with ordinary citizens, who 
often are trying to access basic goods or services in places like hospitals, 
schools, police departments and other agencies” 
• Political corruption “is a manipulation of policies, institutions and rules of 
procedure in the allocation of resources and financing by political decision 
makers, who abuse their position to sustain their power, status and wealth”  
Elizabeth Sietsema identified corruption from the perspective of a public official. 
She cites the following four different types of corruption (Sietsema, 2005): 
• Theft and embezzlement take place when public goods and services are 
stolen or exploited illegally by officials who can access to government 
property. This violation causes the loss of funds for the public expense. 
Therefore, only officials receive benefits but the public loses their interest 
in the stolen goods or services. 
• Self-dealing or conflict of interest occurs when officials take advantage 
from their position in conducting or selecting business transactions for 
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their own benefit rather than group benefit. They choose to act in the way 
that they personally receive benefits. Therefore, this act can ruin 
competition and create a monopoly, which is inefficient for economic 
development. 
• Nepotism and patronage are the use of officials’ authority to promote their 
family, friends, or partisans to be in influential positions. It is usually 
found in political practice because it helps political parties to support their 
stability. However, nepotism and patronage can lead incompetent or 
unethical people to important positions in organizations and leave out 
some capable personnel. In fact, patronage strongly depends on social 
norms and some cultures cite patronage as a common practice. Therefore, 
it can exist in the working environment without any notice.  
• Bribery and extortion are similar, but extortion differs from bribery in that 
the officials ask for payment in exchange for their decision or vote. At 
least two groups of people gain their interests by using money or benefit 
from the exchange of complimentary goods or services. Bribery is used 
most often in corruption. The bribery in high levels of management has a 
stronger impact on the economic scale. High-level officials have the 
authority and ability to make a decision involving the use of public goods 
and services.  
6. The Consequences of Corruption 
Shleifer and Vishny (1993) agree that corruption may be costly to economic 
development for a couple of reasons: 
• “The weakness of central government” means when the government 
allows its officials and private agents to seek bribes for supplementary 
benefit, buyers can access public goods and services without regulation 
based upon a bribe they pay. This can result in higher and higher costs due 
to the accelerating bribes, impeding new investment due to the deficiency 
of regulation and price.      
• “The distortions entailed by the necessary secrecy of corruption” means 
that since the corruption is illegal, it has to be kept as a secret. Benefits 
gained from corruption can motivate people who administer a country and 
are likely to change its investment from highest value project into lowest 
one in order to seek more personal profit from the opportunities for secret 
corruption. Since the lowest value projects, such as defense or 
infrastructure, have a tendency to be corrupted more easily and they are 
attractive for government officials, and the distortions can discourage 
necessary investment such as healthcare or education.     
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B. PROCUREMENT PROCESS 
According to the International Handbook of Public Procurement, the 
procurement process can be divided into many stages (Thai, 2009): 
1. Procurement Planning  
Procurement planning determines what the government is going to purchase and 
when. Procurement phase provides information on the alternatives for goods and services 
and highlights possible risk so that officials can make a decision properly. To ensure that 
procurement will meet the requirement in the most effective, economical, and timely 
manner, a procurement plan is usually created as soon as the agency’s need is known. A 
budget cannot be spent by government agencies until it is appropriated or apportioned, 
which involves a very long and complicated process. Therefore, planning regularly starts 
in advance of the fiscal year.   
2. Preparing and Processing Procurement Requests 
The procurement request (PR) is a request showing the important information and 
approvals for procurement, such as the need of users. The user agency prepares and 
submits the PR to the central procurement office in order to begin conducting the 
procurement action. The procurement staff and the users have to discuss and consult in 
detail with each other so that they can get precise information before releasing a 
solicitation. This stage may include conducting market research to collect and analyze 
information about vendors and products existing in the market so as to identify sources 
and alternatives. 
3. Developing and Reviewing Requirements Documents 
By developing and reviewing requirements documents procurement officials can 
better ensure that criteria in solicitations at least meet the minimum requirements of the 
agencies. These requirements documents include specifications, statements of work 
(SOW) or statements of objectives (SOO), which indicate an item’s performance and 
objective but not the item’s capability that vendors offer. In other words, the SOW or 
SOO identifies the agency’s reason for procuring a product or service as well as the 
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agency’s expectations for the product or service’s performance. These documents, 
however, do not specify a vendor or its capabilities. Also, the requirements documents 
should consider supply support options that can provide support to other similar existing 
items.  
4. Planning for Evaluation 
Teams, methods, and criteria have to be considered to evaluate proposals in order 
to achieve the best value procurement in terms of cost, performance, and schedule. An 
evaluation team consists of various kinds of professional staff who are appointed to the 
procurement committee. They help user agencies to develop procurement plans for 
identifying evaluation criteria, which create relative merit of one proposal over others. 
The evaluation team also has to ensure that all offerors are treated in an equal and fair 
manner in accordance with government policy or common practice. Ultimately, these 
criteria are used to identify the agency’s needs in order of priority so that countries will 
acquire “best value” items. 
5. Contract Award 
After awarding the contract to a selected offeror, the procurement professional 
manages contract-awarded activities, which include determining responsibility, preparing 
the award, signing the contract, debriefing the losing companies, and coping with 
possible protests while complying with related laws and regulations. Determining 
responsibility and a binding agreement helps to ensure that the contract is lawful and 
more tangible. Also, being able to request a debriefing helps offering companies to know 
why with their proposals were not selected and how to improve for the future. However, 
the contract award procedure may vary depending on contract methods and results.   
6. Contract Administration  
A project manager or a contract administration team will issue a notice to 
proceed, which is a set of contract administration documents that ensure the awarded 
contractor will comply with the conditions in the contract. During this stage, if there is 
any dispute, it should be resolved according to the procurement laws and regulations. In 
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some complex contracts, the contract administration team consists of various personnel 
from different fields, such as technical project personnel, financial auditors or legal 
counsel. In some guidance, contract administration is not the final stage of the 
procurement process. The final stage in those situations is contracting close out or 
termination. This stage is not always included because it takes place at the end of an 
item’s life cycle, and some items have long life cycles. A warship, for example, can have 
40-year or longer life cycle.  
Similarly, Garrett simply summarized the procurement process into six steps 
according to the flowchart shown in Figure 1 (Garrett, 2007).   
                                             Source: World Class Contracting, 4th edition, 2007 
Figure 1.  Procurement Cycle (from Garrett, 2007) 
 
C. CAUSES OF CORRUPTION  
Although it is certain that immorality of people is the primary cause of corruption, 
some characteristics of the procurement process can motivate officials to commit 
corruption. The International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption discusses 
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possible causes of corruption; some of them are related to corruption in defense 
procurement. 
1. Size of the Public Sector  
Government size and corruption tend to have an inverse relationship with each 
other. There is evidence that in high-income countries, which have large governments, 
their corruption problems relatively decrease (Graeff and Mehlkop, 2003). By contrast, 
small governments in less affluent countries are likely to experience corruption in the 
procurement process because these governments usually do not have enough budget or do 
not have the necessary liquidity to operate efficiently. The lack of resources from 
people’s taxes encourages officials to get funding from corruption. Furthermore, 
redistribution activities have more potential to be corrupted than other types of 
government expenditure. Due to the fact that most defense procurements are enormous, 
tremendous amounts of money can motivate corrupt officials to commit fraud.   
2. Regulatory Quality  
The poor quality of regulations is a major factor in corruption, while effective 
regulations can reduce corruption (Ackerman, 2006). Ill-designed regulations may induce 
officials to exploit national resources as corrupt officials make less effort to find 
loopholes. If government regulations are vague and complicated, there are more 
opportunities for corruption to be committed. On the other hand, the bribe can provoke 
immoral officials to distort policies and take advantage of resources. This exploitation 
can make good regulations ineffective if officials are unethical. However, although 
detecting bad regulations and reforming them can reduce corruption, distinguishing 
between good and bad regulations is difficult and not obvious. Therefore, a well-designed 
regulation should be clear and promote honesty so that it can promote the integrity of 
procurement projects. 
3. Lack of Economic Competition 
“Corruption simply mirrors the absence of economic competition” (Ackerman, 
2006). When government promotes competition for certain projects, suppliers tend to 
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lower their prices to gain a competitive advantage over others. This practice results in 
suppliers receiving less profit. As the suppliers have limited profit to use as a payoff, 
corruption decreases. On the other hand, if there is less competition, corruption can occur 
more easily because suppliers can economically control their prices and raise profit. This 
additional profit can be used as a bribe for exchanging a share. It is certain that when 
there are higher barriers to entry markets, immoral officials and suppliers have more 
opportunities to commit corruption. This suggests that competition and corruption also 
have an inverse relationship with each other. Thus, in order to reduce corruption, defense 
procurement should provide incentives to foster competition.  
However, only having multiple vendors cannot avoid corruption. When there are 
many corrupt firms attending the competition, they can make an illegal agreement to set 
prices artificially higher than the market prices. Bid rigging can ruin the benefit of 
competition. Although the communication between bidders is difficult to monitor, the 
government should have laws and policies as well as market price to detect this 
conspiracy.   
4. Culture 
According to the International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption, the 
level of generalized trust, religion, and acceptance of hierarchy play an important role in 
cultural causes of corruption. Countries that are more accepting of hierarchy but have low 
generalized trust are more likely to experience corruption than countries that have the 
opposite characteristics. Besides, the different conditions of value, influential gender, and 
history in each country can be factors of corruption. These cultural preconditions seem to 
be more difficult to reform because after reform, societies have a tendency to return to 
their intact level of corruption. The effective way to choose a proper anti-corruption 
method is to first consider cultural precondition and then select the suitable one. For 
example, high hierarchy society should use a top-down method to prevent corruption as 
top personnel have high power and influence to their subordinates, so they can create 
anti-corruption practice or policy more effectively.      
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Therefore, causes of corruption can be identified by the cultural preconditions of a 
particular country. 
D. U.S. ANTI-CORRUPTION LAW AND REGULATIONS IN DEFENSE 
PROCUREMENT 
Because of the complex nature of corruption, it is difficult to measure and detect 
corrupt acts. Moreover, perception of corruption differs from culture to culture and 
country to country. Therefore, this study selected the law and regulations of the United 
States, which is a developed country having a good rank on the Corruption Perceptions 
Index (CPI), as examples. In the U.S., there are some federal and state level regulations 
that aim to prevent corruption. The U.S. also accepts some international laws for fighting 
corruption. 
1. Federal Acquisition Regulation  
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) is a major regulation that the U.S. 
imposes on the procurement process. It is publicized to use for acquisition of supplies and 
services and contract procedures, which are applicable for all of the U.S. Federal 
Government agencies, including the Department of Defense (DOD). This set of 
regulations has the force and effect of law; therefore, contracting officers and suppliers 
have to comply with the requirements of the regulations. FAR also prescribes the policies 
of Contractor Code of Business Ethics and Conduct, which require contractors to conduct 
their business with the government with integrity. 
2. General Law on Bribery and Corruption 
According to U.S. law, bribery is considered as a crime under several federal and 
individual state statutes. Prohibited conduct includes “paying, attempting or promising to 
pay, U.S. or non-U.S. government officials improperly to influence their official acts, or, 
in the private context, causing an employee or agent of a company to act in a way 
contrary to the interests of their employer” (Woolf Committee, 2008, p. 139). Bribery of 
both U.S. and non-U.S. government officials is prohibited by U.S. federal law. In 
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addition, there are individual state laws that make bribery a crime (Woolf Committee, 
2008). 
3. U.S. Federal Law on Bribery and Corruption (The U.S. Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act) 
The U.S. uses the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) as a main anti-corruption 
tool. FCPA was enacted in 1977 with the intention of halting corrupt practices and 
increasing public confidence in the integrity of business. The main reason for enactment 
of FCPA was the Watergate political scandal. The FCPA contains both anti-bribery and 
accounting provisions.  
All U.S. persons, companies, and company employees must comply with the 
FCPA. The FCPA can also apply when non-U.S. individuals engage in prohibited acts 
within the United States (Woolf Committee, 2008). 
The Department of Justice (DOJ) and Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) have the responsibility of enforcing the FCPA’s anti-bribery and accounting 
provisions. The U.S DOJ has directed some actions that show the elements of effective 
programs for transparency:  
• “A clearly articulated corporate policy against violations of the FCPA and 
other applicable anti-bribery laws;  
• The designation of senior official(s) with oversight responsibility;  
• The establishment of a committee to review third-party relationships;  
• Due diligence procedures;  
• A training program;  
• Disciplinary procedures regarding violations of the compliance program;  
• Procedures to report suspected improper conduct, including an anonymous 
‘hotline’;  
• Contract language in consultancy, joint venture and other agreements with 
business associates that proscribe improper payments;  
• The maintenance of books and records and establishment of a system of 
internal accounting controls; and  
• The periodic internal audit of the program” (Woolf Committee, 2008, p. 
140 ). 
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4. U.S. State Law on Bribery and Corruption 
Other than the federal and state laws described previously, the U.S. has accepted 
several other global anti-corruption laws to prevent corruption on the international level. 
The regulations accepted by the U.S. are the: 
• Inter-American Convention against Corruption (1996) 
• Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Convention 
against Bribery of Foreign Public Officials (1998) 
• United Nations (UN) Convention against Corruption (2003) 
5. United States Defense Industry Initiative (DII) on Business Ethics and 
Conduct 
DII is a non-profit organization that is comprised of leaders and employers from 
77 companies. The main purpose of the organization is to provide a culture of integrity 
and transparency in the DOD’s businesses. DII shares best practices to provide the 
highest ethical standards for government agents to apply. DII makes industry sources 
available to help train employees and to promote an ethical culture in compliance with 
laws (Styles, 2013). 
E. DRUYUN CASE  
Although there are some anti-corruption laws intended to prevent corruption in 
the U.S., sometimes these laws are not enough to deter people from dishonest actions. To 
illustrate a problem of corruption in the procurement process, in this section we examine 
the Druyun Case—one of the infamous cases involving fraud, especially conflict of 
interest—as it relates to transparency.    
1. Background 
Darleen A. Druyun, the Principal Deputy Undersecretary of the United States Air 
Force (USAF) for acquisition, was one of the highest officials responsible for 
procurement who provided advice on acquisition to senior executives in the Department 
of the Air Force. In October 2004, she pleaded guilty to violating “the conflict of 
interest” statute. As she was nearing retirement from the USAF, she asked for 
employment for herself from The Boeing Company while she was an Air Force official 
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who was directly involved in the lease of 100 Boeing KC 767A tanker aircraft (Gayton, 
2004). 
In FY 2002, the DOD Appropriations Act authorized the USAF for the 
acquisition of refueling aircrafts replacing the fleet of KC-135E (Stratotankers), aging 
Boeing-built tankers. The contract for this acquisition involved leasing 100 KC 767A 
aircraft rather than purchasing them. Although Congress approved the proposed lease, the 
lease proposal has been controversial in regard to transparency. Table 1 is a cost 
comparison between leasing, non-multiyear buying, and multiyear buying, which 
illustrates why the lease proposal has been controversial. 
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- $3.9 - 19% - $5.7 -27% 
Source: CRS calculations based on Air Force Model, July 1, 2003. 
Table 1.   Cost of Lease vs. Multiyear Buy and Alternate Assumptions 
Compared with other buying methods, leasing is more expensive. However, 
USAF dealt with the lease of 100 KC-767 tankers from Boeing after source selection.  
At the time, Druyun was working in the USAF and overseeing many acquisition 
programs, including a controversial $21 billion deal for Boeing KC 767A tanker aircraft. 
As she had worked in the acquisition field for longer than ten years, she was well known 
and had a good relationship with executives of giant companies, especially Michael 
Sears, Chief Financial Officer of Boeing. Back in 2000, Druyun contacted Sears to aid 
Heather Druyun, her daughter, and Michael McKee, her daughter’s boyfriend who 
became her son-in-law later, in getting jobs at Boeing. This act shows a good relationship 
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between Druyun and Boeing, and it is certain that one good turn deserves another. As she 
was influential in the Air Force acquisition decision-making, many huge companies such 
as Lockheed Martin and Boeing sought after Druyun; so they both offered her a good 
position and salary. Besides, Druyun planned to retire in November 2002 and was 
looking for a job after retirement. The timing seemed right for her and the company, but 
not the USAF. In November 2002, Druyun became a Boeing Vice President with a 
generous salary (Global Security, 2013).  
As Druyun negotiated for her and her family members’ employment with Boeing 
while she was an influential government official, her behavior led to the violations of 
many laws and regulations. She violated several statutes including the Conflict of Interest 
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 208; the Major Fraud Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1031, 18 U.S.C. § 1001, and 
18 U.S.C. § 371 (Gayton, 2004). Also, she violated the Federal Acquisition Regulation 
(FAR), § 3.101-1, which provides that “Government business shall be conducted in a 
manner above reproach and, except as authorized by statute or regulation, with complete 
impartiality and with preferential treatment for none. Transactions relating to the 
expenditure of public funds require the highest degree of public trust and an impeccable 
standard of conduct. The general rule is to avoid strictly any conflict of interest or even 
the appearance of a conflict of interest in Government-contractor relationships” (FAR, § 
3.101-1). As a result, she was sentenced to nine months in prison and Michael Sears was 
sentenced to four months. The Air Force’s lease of 100 KC-767A tankers was frozen and 
eventually canceled in 2006. 
2. Analysis 
a. Conflict of Interest 
In this case, Druyun had too much control over all the acquisition process without 
sufficient oversight, resulting in a conflict of interest. The conflict of interest cannot be 
easily detected until personal benefits are revealed. In this case the corruption, a conflict 
of interest, was obvious because the official took advantage of her position for her own 
benefit. Druyun gave a favor to Boeing by supporting the contract for KC-767A tankers 
because she expected employment opportunities for herself. The investigators would not 
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have discovered this violation if Druyun had not retired and been employed at Boeing 
subsequently. This shows the lack of proper oversight mechanism during the process, 
which allowed the corruption to occur and which caused a lack of competition. 
b. Lack of Economic Competition 
The consequences of Druyun’s action ruined competition between among 
companies. When the market lacked economic competition, only Boeing could take 
advantage of the KC-767A tankers contract by raising prices in order to gain more profits 
for the company. It is certain the Boeing had to make additional profits by paying Druyun 
back in the form of a salary or bonus. Similar to a monopoly, Boeing could determine the 
price of contract and made the contract much more expensive. Because the KC-767A 
tankers are considered essential to the public’s welfare, Druyun distorted this competition 
in the high level of management so as to benefit at the expense of the public good. 
Accordingly, the price of the lease was almost $6 billion higher than purchasing. This 
abuse can be considered as a grand corruption, and the price of corruption bears down on 
USAF and Government, and finally on the taxpayers.   
c. Size of Procurement 
According to a Congressional Research Service (CRS) report, “By the year 2005, 
the Air Force would need 500 to 600 KC-135R tankers—or their equivalent—to meet the 
tanker needs of the national military strategy” (Bolkcom, 2003); the number of required 
tanker aircrafts suggests that size of the whole project is gigantic. Although the project 
that Druyun dealt with was just one sixth of the total requirement, its cost of $21 billion 
tempted both officials and companies to commit fraud. Corruption could make offenders 
rich, and it is worth for them to take such a risk by inflating the price of contracts or 
changing the method of acquisition.  
d. Laws and Regulations 
Laws and regulations are the main tools for helping the procurement process to be 
more transparent, so they should be efficient. Laws and regulations, such as the Code of 
Business Ethics in the FAR, are also guidance for ethical standards. The Druyun case 
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shows that effective regulations and law enforcement can prevent corruption in the 
procurement process even though the conflict of interest could not be detected 
immediately during the crime. The FBI was able to impose law by using its authority to 
investigate back through the years in the case, and apparently, found there were crimes 
committed. There have been many ethical rules and effective law enforcements as well as 
improved procurement regulations in the U.S., such as DOD Instruction 5000.02, and the 
Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009. It is more difficult for officials to 
commit fraud in the U.S. than it is in other countries whose laws are not well designed. 
Thus, the quality of the laws and regulations can control the amount of relative 
corruption.    
e. Vulnerable Stages in the Procurement Process 
In the procurement process, although there are many complex stages, only a few 
stages provide sufficient opportunities and incentive for people to commit fraud. These 
stages include those in which a key decision is made such as source selection, contract 
award or contract negotiation. In the Druyun case, although Druyun did not make 
decisions for the lease on her own, during the contract negotiation, she could influence 
the committee to favor Boeing and reveal some information that gave Boeing a 
competitive advantage. She traded her favoritism and influence for prospective 
employment with Boeing, distorting the procurement process, which is intended to 
acquire the best value items for the country. As a result, the government lost benefits 
while the supplier got more. Therefore, the decision-making stages in the procurement 
process have to be monitored carefully.  
F. CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX (CPI) 
After reviewing the prominent fraud case related to the defense procurement 
process in the U.S., this study now introduces how the defense procurement in the 
Druyun case involves a transparency issue. With effective and accessible regulations and 
laws of procurement, the U.S. defense procurement process is used as an example of 
study in transparency. The United States is considered to be in the world’s top 20 for 
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transparency because its average CPI for the last 12 years is 7.32, while the average CPIs 
of Thailand and Turkey are about 4 (see Figure 2).  
As this study will show, it is understandable that the problems of corruption in 
Thailand and Turkey are more severe and complicated. Although the main cause of 
corruption is the lack of people’s morality, other factors can encourage or discourage 
officials or contractors from engaging in dishonest activities. The Druyun fraud case is a 
useful starting point for understanding which aspects of procurement cause corruption 
and which tools are used to solve problems.  
 
    Source: Transparency International, 2013c 
Figure 2.  CPI Comparison by Ranking. 
However, can CPI provide reliable and valid results of corruption and serve as a 
real corruption indicator? As there are many interpretations of the CPI, critics differ on its 
value. Transparency International (TI) released CPI as a “corruption” measurement 
instrument for determining the level of corruption in 177 countries around the world. TI 
still publicizes the new CPI score and rankings every year. This index has a value scale 
from 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (highly transparent) to show the level of perceived 
corruption in countries, and its ranking from 1 (highly transparent) to 177 (highly 
corrupt) illustrates a particular country’s position relative to others.  
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Saisana and Saltelli believe that CPI is an effective indicator for several reasons. 
Although the CPI uses surveys from 13 sources that are highly associated and seem to be 
biased, it is not dominated by the individual sources. Therefore, its information is non-
redundant because it uses statistical justification to simplify averages across the sources. 
Also, having global parameters to determine countries’ rankings covers more countries, 
so CPI can demonstrate effectively the level of corruption in countries. This method 
differs from some sources that assess only the same level of corruption. Finally, CPI 
considers adjusting the statistical significance among countries when comparing the 
results to make clear that the CPI scores are carefully interpreted from the same common 
sources. Thus, CPI can contribute effectively and fairly to the measurement of countries’ 
perceived corruption at the worldwide level (Saisana & Saltelli, 2012). 
However, De Maria argues that CPI projects the image of countries in terms of 
corruption rather than assisting countries to reduce corruption. Even though TI does not 
intend to create “brand” for countries, CPI’s rankings can make some countries be seen 
as winners and losers. Certainly information from TI, the most prominent anti-corruption 
non-governmental organization in the world, influences people’s perceptions. This would 
create brand for countries, especially the country at the lowest rank. For example, Haiti, 
Myanmar, and Iraq are at the bottom of the table and considered to be corrupt countries. 
They are discouraged from adapting themselves to perform better because the correlation 
between perceived and actual corruption is low. Hence, CPI may not be the best solution 
to deterring corruption and may even decrease the performance of anti-corruption 
Programs (De Maria, 2008). 
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III. TURKEY’S PROCUREMENT PROCESS AND 
TRANSPARENCY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents an analysis of the Turkish defense procurement process. As 
a member of NATO, Turkey uses NATO procurement standards to some extent. But, 
there are also some other principles applied to the Turkish defense procurement process 
due to the strategic location of Turkey and the power that the military has. Beginning 
from the 2000s, there has been an integration process with the European Union (EU) that 
affects not only Turkey’s relations with other countries but also every kind of process, 
including defense planning, budgeting, and procurement. In addition to this integration 
process, Turkey has been driving for independent and local defense capabilities to 
provide security and deterrence and to protect secularity. The Turkish defense 
procurement process is comprised of organizations that provide vision and decide 
requirements, and laws and other regulations that provide basic principles applied to the 
procurement process. This chapter provides detailed information to promote a better 
understanding of the Turkish defense procurement process. 
Chapter research questions underlying the analysis of the procurement process 
are: 
• What is the importance of the military for Turkey? 
• What are the organizations that play an important role in the procurement 
process? 
• What is the civil-military relationship in Turkey? 
• What efforts are being made to build transparency in Turkey?  
B. OVERVIEW 
Turkey is located at the strategic crossroads of Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and 
the Caucasus. This area can be described as the home for unending problems. Also, 
Turkey faces internal security threats, including ethno-nationalist extremist, religious, and 
right/left wing groups. Some of these threats can be identified as the Kurdistan Workers’ 
Party, al-Qaeda, Turkish Hezbollah and the Great Eastern Islamic Raiders’ Front.  
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Considering all these security problems, Turkey has a very big army, the largest 
in Europe and the second largest in NATO, to provide deterrence and security. However, 
having a big army is not enough to ensure deterrence. Modernization and technology are 
also needed in fulfilling security missions. For this reason, Turkey looks for a modern 
army equipped with high-tech systems. In order to satisfy its security needs, Turkey 
stands as the fourth largest importer of arms and the world’s twenty-eighth largest arms 
exporter. In recent years, Turkey has been driving for self-sufficiency and independence 
in defense procurement. Administrative, political, financial, and military reforms are 
being implemented to make real the desire for independence in defense procurement 
(McGregor, 2008). 
C. HISTORY 
The history of the Turkish defense industry goes back to the seventeenth century. 
Until the Industrial Revolution that took place in the eighteenth century, the Ottoman 
Empire was one of the powerful governments of the world and had the most advanced 
technology in Europe. But starting after the Industrial Revolution, the Turkish defense 
industry gradually faded away. 
In the first quarter of the twentieth century, there were significant obstacles for the 
Turkish defense industry. The Mondoros Ceasefire Agreement, signed at the end of the 
First World War for Turkey, required that all military facilities shut down (Ozlu, 2006). 
But after the Independence War (1919‒1923), establishing an independent defense 
industry was important for the newly born republic. Therefore, ammunition and 
maintenance/repair facilities were established as a first step for an independent defense 
industry. 
During the Second World War, Turkey refrained from entering the war, but at the 
same time focused on being prepared for a probable war. After becoming a NATO 
member, Turkey’s defense industry changed its area of focus. With the help of U.S. aid, 
Turkey’s defense industry started to grow internationally. The first State Economic 
Enterprise in the defense area emerged in this period, one of which was Machinery and 
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Chemical Industry Corporation, established to provide ammunition for Turkish Armed 
Forces (TAF). 
Turkey’s Peace Operation to Cyprus (1974) can be seen as a milestone for the 
Turkish defense industry. The U.S. embargo followed by the operation, necessitated 
establishment of national defense industry. The first initiatives of this period were 
ASELSAN (1975) and HAVELSAN (1982). ASELSAN was founded in 1975 by the 
Turkish Army Foundation to meet the communications electronic needs of TAF. 
ASELSAN is now Turkey’s leading electronics company that meets almost all of the 
communication needs of TAF. The second initiative of this period was HAVELSAN, 
which was founded by Air Force Foundation to meet maintenance requirement of radar 
systems that Turkish Air Forces have. Currently, HAVELSAN takes parts in wide range 
of defense related activities, some of which are modernization of aircrafts and production 
of missile systems. 
The 1980s can be defined as the reorganization decade for the defense industry. 
After the 1980 Coup, the military government aimed to establish a highly developed 
defense industry and to modernize Turkish Armed Forces. The establishment of the 
Defense Equipment Directorate as a state enterprise was the first step in this direction. 
However, the shortcomings stemming from its inert status blocked its success and before 
long the Law No.3238 established the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries (SSM) in 
1985. In 1987, the Foundation for Strengthening the Turkish Armed Forces was 
established to help develop defense capabilities. In 1998, Defense Industry Politics and 
Strategy Document that contains the government directive for the defense industry was 
published. Turkish defense systems acquisition policy redefined and restructured by this 
document (Undersecretariat for Defense Industries, 2014a). 
The tables in Figures 3 and 4 show Turkish defense spending for the last 25 years. 
According to the SIPRI Yearbook 2013, Turkey is in the fifteenth position by military 
spending. 
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 Figure 3.  Defense Spending of Turkey 1988‒2012 (from SIPRI, 2013). 
 
Figure 4.  Defense Spending as a Percentage of the GDP 1988‒2012 (from SIPRI, 
2013). 
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D. DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL CAPABILITIES 
Since the establishment of SSM, the Turkish defense industry has started to grow 
rapidly. Until the 2001 economic crisis, defense spending of Turkey followed an 
increasing trend. With the 2001 economic crisis in Turkey, the amount of defense 
spending started to go down. However, the importance of research and development was 
understood in this period, and R&D received significant investments. With the help of 
these investments, 54.04% of Turkish defense requirements were met locally in 2011. 
Among these investments and the areas supported are: 
Exports in Defense and Aerospace: 1,262,000,000 dollars as of year 2012 
Total Turnover of Defense Industry: 4,756,380,651 dollars 
Total R&D Expenses: 772,751,351 dollars 
Coverage Ratio of TSK Demands from Domestic Market (YİKO): 54.04 % (As of 
 year 2011) 
 
Table 2 shows that Turkey gives significant importance to R&D and has been 
spending approximately 5.4% of total defense spending on R&D. The main objective of 
spending significant amount of money on R&D is to procure most of the defense systems 
on natural sources. 
 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Procurement 7.677 7.499 7.582 7.334 7.472 
 
37.6% 37.9% 39.4% 39.6% 39.9% 
RDT&E 1.053 1.008 1.035 0.997 1.013 
 
5.2% 5.1% 5.4% 5.4% 5.4% 
Total 20.442 19.768 19.23 18.519 18.724 
  Source: IHS Jane’s Defense Budgets, 2014  
Table 2.   Turkey’s Defense Spending by Function (USD billion). 
Turkey uses partnerships in the defense industry to improve its own defense 
technology—especially partnership projects with the U.S. and Germany that help Turkey 
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to acquire advanced technology. Table 3 shows the top five countries that Turkey imports 
from and the percentages of total amount spent on defense imports. 
 
 
Country Value (USD billion) Percentage 
U.S. 3217 47% 
Germany 2053 30% 
UK 548 8% 
France  534 7.8% 
South Korea 342 5% 
Source: SIPRI, IHS Jane’s, 2014 
Table 3.   Turkey’s Defense Imports during 2000‒2010. 
E. ORGANIZATIONS IN DEFENSE PROCUREMENT AND THEIR ROLES 
The following organizations have significant roles in Turkey’s defense acquisition 
process: 
• Council of Ministers: Deciding general policy 
• The Defense Industry High Coordination Board: Providing directives 
• Defense Industry Executive Committee: Decision making 
• Turkish General Staff: Deciding needs and requirements 
• Undersecretariat for Defense Industry (Under Ministry of Defense): 
Industrialization, procurement, exporting, financing 
• Defense Industry Audit Board: Auditing and control of whole process 
• Research Centers, Universities: Design, production, R&D and 
manufacturing. (Secretariat General for EU Affairs, 2014) 
1. Defense Industry Executive Committee (SSIK) 
Ratified by Law 3238, the Defense Industry Executive Committee (Savunma 
Sanayi Icra Komitesi, SSIK) is the main body of the defense acquisition system that is 
chaired by the Prime Minister. The other members of the committee are the Chief of 
General Staff and Ministry of National Defense. According to the Undersecretariat of 
Defense Industries (2014c), the main roles of the committee are: 
• Making critical decisions relating to defense industry issues and major 
defense procurement according to the Armed Forces Strategic Target Plan,  
 30 
• Instructing SSM to conduct research and development of modern arms and 
equipment, and to have their prototypes built, 
• Setting the guidelines for uses of Defense Industry Support Fund. 
(Undersecretariat for Defense Industries, 2014c) 
2. Undersecretariat for Defense Industries (SSM) 
Established by Law 3238, the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries is 
responsible for providing long-term defense policies and continuous flow of financial 
resources. The SSM is the main institution responsible for developing the national 
defense industry to modernize the TAF.  
According to the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries (2014d), SSM’s roles 
can be summarized as: 
• To put into effect the decision of Defense Industry Executive Committee 
• To plan production of modern arms and systems 
• To establish a mechanism to coordinate offset and export issues 
3. Defense Industry Higher Coordination Board (SSYKK) 
Consisting of thirteen members, the Defense Industry Higher Coordination Board 
(SSYKK) convenes twice a year. Members of this board are ministers responsible for 
financial and defense related issues and, Chief of General Staff. This board mainly has 
two roles that are: 
• Coordination of principles enacted by Council of Ministers 
• Determining the procurement policies to acquire weapons/systems 
(Defense Industries, 2006) 
4. Defense Industry Support Fund (SSDF) 
Defense Industry Support Fund (Savunma Sanayi Destek Fonu) is a fund 
provided to the SSM to execute its mission. This fund provides enough money for 
defense spending. It is a very special fund with bureaucracy-free formality that consists 
of some portion of levies and some portion of lottery prizes (Undersecretariat for Defense 
Industries, 2014c). 
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F. LAWS AND REGULATIONS 
1. Law Number 3238  
Law 3238, which was enacted in 1985, brought new principles to the Turkish 
procurement process. Until the enacting of this law, Turkish defense needs were satisfied 
only by state-dominated firms. This law established the SSM, the Defense Industry 
Executive Committee, the Defense Industry Support Fund, and the Defense Industry 
Support Fund. Law 3238 enabled private firms to take part in producing the defense 
needs of Turkey. Following are the four main principles that are stated in Law 3238 
(Undersecretariat for Defense Industries, 2014b): 
• “To make maximum use of Turkey’s existing industrial capabilities and 
potential,  
• To provide direction and assistance to new investments that contain high 
technology,  
• To incorporate foreign technologies and to render possible contributions 
by foreign capital,  
• To encourage research and development activities.” (Undersecretariat for 
Defense Industries, 2014b) 
2. Resolution Number 23378 
This resolution was enacted to meet the requirements of TAF from the national 
defense industry. This resolution also shows the means and principles of developing a 
national defense industry. Since it provides objectives and directives for the defense 
industry, this resolution is the main document for Turkey’s defense procurement process. 
Turkey’s National Military Strategy (TNMS) and the Planning and Programming 
Directive (PPD) are main sources in the determination of the Defense Industry Strategy. 
(Undersecretariat for Defense Industries, 2014a): 
The Defense Industry policy envisages the formation of the infrastructure 
of a defense industry that: 
• Is open to the foreign sector as well as the domestic sector,  
• Has an export potential and capability to compete internationally,  
• Can produce new technology and has a dynamic structure, 
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• Makes it possible to have a balanced defense industry cooperation 
between Turkey and other countries and is influenced to a minimum 
extent by the changing political conditions and 
• Can also engage in production for civilian purposes.” (Undersecretariat for 
Defense Industries, 2014a): 
According to Public Procurement Law, the following methods are used in the 
procurement process in Turkey: 
• Closed and Sealed Envelopes Bidding  
This is the main open tendering procurement method. There are different 
procedures for the items to be procured. For goods and services, the procedure is single-
stage and no threshold is applied. On the other hand, for works, the threshold defines the 
number of stages in the bidding process. If the amount is more than US$73 million, there 
are two stages, while below this threshold amount there is only one stage. Contracts are 
awarded based on the bidders’ qualification scores and the suitability of their bid prices. 
• Selective Restricted Bidding 
This method is used in the procurement of goods such as aircraft, warships, 
ammunition and military supplies. In this method, the procurement entity can either 
advertise or invite a minimum of three previously qualified bidders. The lowest-priced 
bid gets the contract award.  
• Public Bidding 
The price bidding method is used in contracts that are estimated to cost less than 
the threshold, which is defined annually. There are written and oral bid phases of this 
method. 
• Negotiated Procedure 
This method is used either in fifteen applications that are defined in the Public 
Procurement Law or in contracts that are estimated to cost less than US$2.72 million. 
• Competition 
This method is used for services, such as architectural services. After judging the 
best design that meets the requirement, the negotiation method is used to reach the lowest 
price. 
• Other Procedures 
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There are also some other informal methods that can be proposed by one of the 
ministers and must be approved by the Council of Ministers (World Bank, 2001). 
G. ACQUISITION STRATEGIES 
There are some strategies and principles that lead and shape the Turkish defense 
acquisition process: 
1. The Defense Industry Strategy 
The Defense Industry Strategy (DIS) can be described as the production of high 
technology weapons systems in Turkey to meet the needs of Turkish Armed Forces 
(TAF). To In order to meet this objective, it is required that government assist companies 
in the defense industry to acquire developed manufacturing capabilities. 
Turkey’s National Military Strategy (TNMS) and the Planning and Programming 
Directive (PPD) are main sources in the determination of the Defense Industry Strategy. 
The Ministry of National Defense is the coordinating authority to perform DIS and to 
ensure DIS’ conformity with Turkey’s foreign policy and compliance with international 
agreements (Ministry of Defense, 2014). 
2. Weapon System Classification Strategy 
Although satisfying all TAF’s defense needs from domestic sources is the main 
principle, sometimes it is not economical or feasible to do so. Therefore, in Turkey, 
defense systems are categorized as: 
• Nationally produced systems that are to be made inside by using national 
sources 
• Critical system/technologies that are projected to be produced nationally if 
possible, If not, by joint production with other countries 
• Other systems/technologies that are to be acquired from any sources with 
best performance and lowest cost 
Domestic defense capabilities get the priority when meeting defense needs. 
Procurements other than national sources are evaluated regarding the offset applications. 
MOD provides offset principles (Ministry of Defense, 2014). 
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3. R&D Strategy 
The Ministry of Defense gives the directives to the research and development 
(R&D) activities to prepare the national industry for future needs. The objectives of the 
R&D strategy include: 
• Improving R&D activities to produce/acquire higher technology thus 
modernizing TAF. 
• Promoting local/basic R&D activities that can help in improving critical 
technologies. 
• Coordinating and combining all research activities of different 
organizations to get the most benefit. 
Using national technologies is the main principle when it is possible. However, 
sometimes the use of foreign technologies is required when it is not economically or 
technically feasible to acquire a particular technology domestically. As a member of 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Turkey closely follows the R&D activities 
of other NATO members as well as other developed countries of the European Union 
(Ministry of Defense, 2014). Any foreign technologies that are to be purchased must be 
assimilated before using them in satisfying TAF defense needs. 
4. Offset Strategy 
There was no offset policy in military contracts until the joint F-16 project that 
came into being in 1983. With this project, Turkey started to understand the advantages 
and importance of offset practice. SSM is the organization responsible for the 
administration of offsets. In the first year of offset practice, SSM succeeded in 
concluding 31 offset agreements. The Handbook of Offset Regulations, which defines and 
explains the offset procedures, was published by SSM in 1991. Also in 1991, the Offset 
Department whose mission is to oversee offset agreements was established within the 
SSM. 
The Handbook of Offset Regulations requires several criteria to meet offset 
obligations some of which are including the ratio of local contribution, penalties, and 
time for realizing contracts. Replacement of funds that are spent on the imported defense 
systems is the main purpose of offset applications (Kizmaz, 2007). 
 35 
H. TURKEY’S DEFENSE PROCUREMENT PROCESS  
TAF prepares the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) 
document, on which the Turkish defense procurement system is based. The Chief of 
General Staff formulates the Operational Necessity Study and Plan Capability Target 
Document to show the needs of TAF. According to importance of needs, The Chief of 
General Staff prioritizes needs in line with the decision of the National Security Council. 
This plan is subject to revision every two years and is applied as part of the Ten Years’ 
Procurement Program (TUBITAK, 1998). This procurement process is illustrated in the 
workflow shown in Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 5.  The Procurement System in Turkey (from Kizmaz, 2007, p.85). 
I. TRANSPARENCY IN TURKEY’S DEFENSE PROCUREMENT  
1. Civil-Military Relations and Public Opinion  
Before analyzing transparency in the Turkish defense procurement process, we 
need to understand how the military is regarded by the nation. “Turkey has been known 
as a military-nation throughout history and every Turk is a born soldier” (Altinay, 2001, 
p. 53). 
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The mission of the TAF is both to protect Turkey against enemies and to ensure 
democracy and secularism in the country. In addition, the Turkish Army has significant 
influence in politics. After the foundation of the Turkish Republic, with broad public 
support, the army gradually got stronger and stronger in the politics. In the history of the 
Turkish Republic, there have been four coups by which the military aimed to protect the 
unity of the country, secularity, and democracy. All of these four coups were accepted by 
the citizens because of the significant trust they have in the army and its role. Also 
beginning in the 1990s, the Kurdish Insurgency enabled the Turkish Army not only to 
maintain its influence in politics, but also to gain new economic and political power.  
Due to the overwhelming public trust in the army and the political influence the 
army has, every administration has felt obliged to meet the military’s requirements for 
modernization without asking whether it was necessary or not. Also the army has 
remained relatively free of corruption, which has enabled it to gain the reputation as 
being the most trusted national institution in Turkey. For all these reasons, the military 
has never been asked about transparency with regard to the defense budget (Narli, 2003).  
2. Transparency Problems 
The Government Defense Anti-Corruption Index analyzes the corruption 
vulnerability of the ministries of defense and militaries of countries. This analysis 
provides countries with corruption problems in their defense procurement process. After 
two years of research, 82 countries were analyzed according to five main problem areas: 
political, financial, personnel, operations, and procurement. These five main problem 
areas are divided into subsections to understand the root problems better. The analyzed 
countries were placed in one of six bands (A, B, C, D, E, and F) according to their scores. 





a. Political Risk 
Analysis of political problems can be divided into three subsections: 
• Defense and Security Policy 
• Defense Budget 
• Other Political Areas 
First of all, information about the national defense policy is not disclosed to the 
public. Although incomes of the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and TAF are part of the 
national budget, they are not fully publicized. Although enactment of some internal anti-
corruption regulations has been completed, their effectiveness seems still uncertain.  
b. Financial Risk 
Analysis of financial problems can also be divided into three subsections: 
• Asset Disposal 
• Secret Budgets 
• Links to Business 
Regarding financial problems, there seems to be no control over the transparency 
of the asset disposal process. The exact portion of military spending that is dedicated to 
“secret items” is not publicly available. The enterprises that the military have are only 
subject to regulation by private law and there is only limited information about their 
finances. 
c. Personnel Risk 
Personnel problems are analyzed in five subsections: 
• Leadership 
• Payroll and Recruitment 
• Conscription 
• Salary Chain 
• Values, Standards, and Other 
In regard to personnel risk area, there is a lack of regulation that would provide 
for a whistleblowing mechanism. 
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d. Operational Risk 
In Turkey, military doctrines do not address corrupt actions in operations. 
Furthermore, agents who are responsible for detecting and preventing corruption in the 
field do not get formal training. 
e. Procurement Risk 
Although there are some laws and other regulations in place to provide 
transparency, the oversight mechanism needs to be developed. Since the National 
Security Policy Document is not publicly accessible, it is almost impossible to evaluate 
necessity of procurement activities to meet defense needs. There is also a lack of 
evidence of audit, competition regulation, and due diligence for offset contracts. Finally, 
there is no regulation regarding oversight of the agents responsible for contracting. Other 
problems with the procurement process include: 
 
• Absence of Private Military Contractors: Actually, in recent years Turkey 
has started to use private military contractors, but the limited number is 
not enough for transparency. 
• Whistleblowing: Turkey has no mechanism for whistleblowing. 
• Risk Assessment: Turkey does not apply corruption risk assessment in the 
defense sector. 
• Evaluation of Corruption Risk in the Field during Operations: Turkey does 
not deploy trained professionals to monitor corruption risk in the field 
during missions. 
• Guidelines or Training on Corruption Risk in Contracting on Operations: 
In Turkey, there is no training or guidelines for staff to deal with the 
corruption. 
• Robust due diligence requirements for offset programs are lacking in 
Turkey. 
• Transparency of Financing Packages of Defense Procurement: There is a 
limited disclosure of information about financing of defense 
procurements. 
• Control of Subcontractors and Subsidiaries in Defense Procurement: 
Turkey, to some extent, fails to meet this criterion. Not all contractors and 
subcontractors adopt anti-corruption programs (Government Defense 
Anti-Corruption Index, 2013). 
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In Turkey the greatest lack of transparency occurs in tracking defense-related 
expenditures, some of which are reflected under budget headings of other state sectors 
and departments. With the establishment of the Defense Industry Support Fund (SSDF), 
law permits extra-budgetary financing of arms under this fund. Between the years 1997 
and 2000, 86% of the defense expenditures were reflected in the defense budget. The 
SSDF covered the rest, which was non-budgetary. 
The budget of the Ministry of Defense is open to audit and legal inspection, but in 
practice, it is not audited. There is a deep confidence in Turkish Army, and the Turkish 
Grand National Assembly refers to “the necessity of a strong military for the nation’s 
domestic and foreign security” and “the urgency to reserve the required funds to 
modernize the Turkish nation’s army at all costs” when it comes to defense spending. 
This view leaves defense expenditures unaudited (Akca, 2010, p.23). 
In Turkey, there is an institution named the Court of Audit (COA), which is 
similar to the U.S. Government Accountability Office. The main mission of this 
institution is to oversee all public spending. But after two coups in 1971 and 1980, 
oversight of military spending was banned. Article 160 of the 1982 constitution that was 
composed by the leaders of the 1980 coup added the principle of “secrecy of defense 
spending.” In addition, in 1985, an amendment that prevents arms procurement and 
military contracts from auditing was made law by the COA (Narli, 2005).  
Although some transparency-related issues still remain unsolved in the 
procurement system of Turkey, there is significant effort at improvement in this area. 
Progress can also be inferred from the CPI information that TI releases annually. Every 
year TI announces the CPI ranking of countries, which makes it easier to analyze the 
historical improvement of transparency efforts. The chart in Figure 6 presents the 
developing of transparency in Turkey in terms of the CPI. In 2012, Turkey ranked 54th 
among 177 countries and, 54th in 2013. Although it is not a big progress towards 




Figure 6.  CPI Ranking Trend of Turkey (from Transparency International, 2013c). 
J. EFFORTS FOR TRANSPARENCY-BUILDING IN DEFENSE 
PROCUREMENT 
Since 2001, with the EU and International Monetary Fund requirements, there are 
major efforts for transparency in all public procurements. In the EU Progress Report in 
2002, the European Commission criticized the autonomy of TAF and its spending. In 
response to this criticism, the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) abolished the 
restriction preventing COA from inspecting MOD spending (Akca, 2010). One of the 
first steps for more transparency in public procurement was the publication of the defense 
budget by the MOF (Ministry of Finance) on its webpage. In this document, “Kamu 
Hesaplari Bulteni,” more detailed information can be found on the expenses of the MOD. 
One of the other arrangements that aim to increase transparency was the Law 4734, 
Public Procurement Law. This law was enacted in 2002 to provide more information 
about public expenses. In 2003, another law, the Right to Information Law, enabling 
citizens to access information on public spending and policy, was enacted. In 2005 with 
the Law on Public Financial Management and Control it became a requirement to present 
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more detail on the defense budget to TGNA and to debate longer for the approval of the 
defense budget (Akca, 2010).  
1. Publications for Transparency 
In order to make Turkey a more transparent nation in defense procurement, MOD 
has started to publish several documents about public policy and detailed explanations of 
defense expenses. The main document, the Annual White Paper, provides very detailed 
information on defense spending and financial resources. It also reports the MoD’s share 
of the gross national product, transfer and personnel expenses, and special defense 
expenses, among others. 
Another document published yearly is the Annual Report of General 
Appropriateness of the Budget. This document is prepared by the COA in order to 
monitor and report the appropriateness of public spending including defense expenses. 
For a longer-term view of government spending, the public can access the Public 
Accounts Bulletin published by the MOF. In this document, information about past, 
current, and future financial targets and realizations can be found. 
Finally, the National Gazette, which is a regular daily publication, provides 
information on the defense budget and defense budget bills.  
In addition to these publications, other information on defense expenses can be 
found in the web pages of MOD, Turkish General Staff, and MOF (Narli, 2005). 
2. Organization for Transparency: The Turkish Economic and Social 
Studies Foundation (TESEV) 
TESEV is an independent non-governmental think tank that focuses on analyzing 
social, political, and economic problems facing Turkey. It was founded in 1994 and is 
based in Istanbul. TESEV aims to increase the role of civil society in the democratic 
process and to combat corruption by organizing seminars and conferences, and 
publishing reports, books and pamphlets about the current issues. The organization 
mainly focuses on the three areas of democratization, foreign policy and good 
governance.   
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In terms of combating corruption, TESEV has launched a series of policy papers 
to raise the effectiveness, accountability, and transparency in defense and security 
establishments. These policy papers are released in order to bridge the gap between 
academic research and policy decisions. In recent policy papers, TESEV addressed 
problems such as state reform, transparency, anti-corruption, and accountability. TESEV 
is working with the World Bank to eliminate corruption, analyze the nature and extent of 
corruption, and combine the results to submit policy proposals. So far, TESEV has 
published more than two hundred policy papers to make Turkey a more democratic 
country and to fight against corruption. At TESEV’s official website all of these policy 
(or position) papers can be found in a downloadable version. 
Regarding corruption, an analysis from Ismet Akca (2010) touches on the military 
economic structure, including analysis of the structure and trends of military spending, 
problems and solutions, concerning the current situation in Turkey (TESEV, 2014). 
3. International Transparency 
As a member of NATO and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (OSCE), Turkey exchanges information on defense spending with both NATO 
and OSCE members as a requirement of information exchange arrangements.   
Under the Vienna Document (1999), it is agreed by all member countries to share 
in the Annual Exchange of Military Information, which includes information regarding 
“military forces concerning the military organization, manpower and major weapon and 
equipment systems” (OSCE, 2014). According to the Vienna Document Article II, 
members are also required to provide information regarding their defense planning 
(Vienna Document, 2014).  
K. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter presented information on the history of the Turkish defense industry, 
the Turkish defense procurement process, and the reasons for Turkey’s desire to have 
independent and internally developed defense capabilities. Only after the 1990s have 
there been some attempts to achieve an independent defense industry. This chapter also 
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provided information about Turkey’s defense acquisition policy and strategies. 
Organizations and their roles in defense procurement, laws, and regulations providing 
procurement principles are explained in detail. The factors that give direction to defense 
planning and budgeting are presented in order to show an understanding of the overall 
acquisition policy and how they impact transparency.  
The Turkish defense procurement uses very complicated financial resources. 
SSM, the main body of defense acquisition, uses the Defense Industry Support Fund, 
which provides constant cash flow, to carry out its mission. Since the start of this century, 
Turkey has been part of an integration process with the EU that affects not only its 
relations with other countries but also every kind of process, including defense planning, 
budgeting and procurement. In response to critical reports by the European Counsel, the 
Turkish Grand National Assembly enacted several laws to provide transparency in 
military spending. In addition to governmental actions to provide transparency, a non-
governmental organization, TESEV, aims to increase the role of civil society in the 
democratic process and to combat corruption by organizing seminars and conferences, 
and publishing reports, books, and pamphlets about the current issues.    
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IV. THAILAND’S DEFENSE PROCUREMENT PROCESS AND 
TRANSPARENCY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents an analysis of Thailand’s defense procurement process. 
Throughout Thailand’s history, the Thai military has been involved in politics in every 
era for many reasons, but one of the most important reasons has been for the allocation of 
funding for military improvement. Military expenditure has risen or declined depending 
on the situation of military at the time. The defense industrial capability is another factor 
that indicates the effort of military development. Unfortunately, Thailand lacks advanced 
technology in the defense industrial capability; purchasing weapons and equipment from 
friendly countries is a solution that Thailand has been using. To understand the problem 
of transparency in these various areas of Thailand’s defense procurement program, it is 
essential to understand the organizations, processes, regulations, and decision makers 
involved. This chapter provides such information. 
Chapter research questions underlying the analysis of the procurement process 
are: 
• How influential is the military in Thailand? 
• What are the organizations that play an important role in defense 
procurement? 
• Where are the important points in the defense procurement process that 
can cause loopholes? 
• What are the problem areas related to transparency in Thailand’s defense 
procurement process? 
B. OVERVIEW 
Thailand is located at the center of Indochina in Southeast Asia. It is one of the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, which is the economic organization that has an 
aim to develop regional economy, culture, and stability. Although Thailand has no clear 
external threat, internal threats seem to be the main problem obstructing the country from 
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development. One is the problem from South Thailand insurgency; the other is a political 
crisis since a coup d’état in 2006 during Thaksin’s administration.   
According to these two main problems, the military are focusing and spending 
most budgets for operations in the Deep South area, while the government manipulates 
the political power to balance the military. This makes for less improvement in major 
arms acquisition. Military modernization is also haphazard as the country has few serious 
research and development projects. Most of major weapons are imported due to the lack 
of high-technology weapons production caused by inefficient acquisitions. When there 
are a lot of imports, the tremendous amounts of military spending make corruption more 
likely. 
C. HISTORY 
Thai politics were influenced by the military for a long time after the Siamese 
Revolution in 1932 when Thailand became a constitutional monarchy. However, the rise 
of the middle class led to economic growth and social transformation resulting in less 
military domination. After the 1970s, the national threats of communist and armed 
separatists gradually vanished. In 1992, the National Assembly passed a constitutional 
amendment to prevent the involvement of active military officers in politics. 
Furthermore, this amendment ensured that only a Member of Parliament can become 
Prime Minister. Even though there had been several military coups in Thailand’s history, 
this amendment effectively reduced the power of military leaders who had had a strong 
role in Thai politics. Since the mid-1990s due to the emergence of Southeast Asia’s 
military during the post-Cold War era, Thailand developed its defense capabilities by 
modernizing its armed forces. The first defense White Paper written in 1994 made clear 
that the Thai military was focused on modernization by procuring more modern 
weaponry. Considering the increase of Thailand’s Military Expenditure, as shown in 
Figure 7, we can see that the military was still the major influence in arms procurement—
even though at the time civilians had more power to control the military (Singh, 1998). 
In 1997, Thailand was facing a severe financial crisis, which caused a reduction in 
military expenditure. This financial crisis had impacted military expenditure from that 
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time until 2006 as shown in the graph in Figure 7. The defense sector experienced the 
second largest budget cut following the infrastructure sector. This financial constraint 
pressured the Thai armed forces to cancel many proposed defense modernization 
programs, such as the military satellite project, two medium-sized submarines, and eight 
F/A-18 jets. Moreover, the devaluation of the currency caused the postponement of other 
arms procurements and international training opportunities. The economic crisis also 
adversely affected the defense budget allocation in the long term. The Thai Armed Forces 
had to restructure their organization to be more efficient under budget constraints. 
Consequently, the Thai military was modernized into a compact size with centralized 
command and control (Navanugraha, 1999). 
 
 
Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI, 2013) 
Figure 7.  Defense Spending of Thailand 1988‒2012 (SIPRI, 2013). 
In 2006, there was a military coup led by General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, who was 
the commander-in-chief of Army at the time, expelling Thaksin Shinawatra from the 
position of prime minister. After the coup, military expenditure was doubled within a few 
years, as shown in Figure 7. As the Thai Armed Forces have a major focus on internal 
security, the majority of expenditure was used for troop deployment to Southern 
Thailand, which has been confronting an ethnic separatist insurgency. Another major area 
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of military expenditure is military modernization, which includes training and 
procurement programs from foreign countries for combat aircraft, airborne early warning 
systems, and the preparation of the first fleet submarine. 
Significant defence investment has allowed the Thai government to 
embark on a major modernisation programme that will supplement and in 
certain cases replace its aging Cold War assets and allow it to retain 
strategic parity with its neighbours. Due to the very limited capacity of the 
domestic defence industrial base, however, those modernisation plans will 
remain reliant on foreign suppliers, which Thailand has been seeking to 
diversify in recent years. (Taylor, 2011) 
The increase of military expenditure before 1997 and after 2006 suggests that the 
Thai Armed Forces are still dependent on politics. The main reason for the expenditure is 
to recapitalize their aging weapons and equipment. In order to gain sufficient budget and 
increase expenditure, the military has to be involved in governmental administration in 
either a direct or indirect way. At the same time, the public is interested in overseeing its 
military.  
Over time there have been some cases of fraud and corruption in defense 
acquisition, such as the GT200 and the army’s surveillance airship. GT200, a plastic case 
made by Britain’s Global Technical, was exposed as a fake bomb detector after many 
countries purchased to use by their armed forces, Thailand is one of them. Thai Armed 
Forces had purchased and deployed GT200 to operate in southern Thailand since 2007. 
Thai government spent more than US$20 million to buy this equipment without 
parliamentary consensus, as it was a military project for protecting insurgency. Scientists 
criticized this equipment as functioning no better than guesswork. The results from 
incorrect detections in GT200 caused failures in military operations and judgment 
processes. Many soldiers and police were killed and injured because of the failed 
detections. Also, hundreds of innocent people were arrested by this unreliable detector 
causing injustice in the southern provinces (Magnier, 2010). Such incidents have 
tarnished the image of the acquisition process in terms of transparency. 
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D. DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL CAPABILITIES 
Government-run institutions lead the defense industry in Thailand and get support 
from the private sector. The acquisition focus on foreign military technologies is 
integrated with domestic programs, most of which are government-run factories and 
facilities owned by the Ministry of Defense (MOD). The Royal Thai Army runs 21 
factories, which is the largest number among the services. In the private sector, there are 
20 to 25 companies focusing on Thailand’s defense industry and about 20 firms are 
currently involved in defense industry activities.   
According to Table 4, the average spent on Thai defense procurement in 2009 was 
18.1% while R&D accounted for only about 2% of total defense spending.  
 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Procurement 1.186 0.969 0.985 1.034 1.137 1.145 
 
18.1% 18.4% 18.5% 18.8% 18.9% 19.2% 
RDT&E 0.143 0.118 0.123 0.128 0.143 0.144 
 
2.2% 2.2% 2.3% 2.3% 2.4% 2.4% 
Total 6.542 5.276 5.318 5.51 6.03 5.953 
                Source: IHS Jane’s Defense Budgets, 2014  
Table 4.   Thailand’s Defense Spending by Function (USD billion).  
The low R&D funding and limits of the local defense industry reflect the 
effectiveness and motivation of defense development, which relies on a high level of 
technology imports while exports are insignificant. Unfortunately, the capabilities of 
Thailand’s defense industry are limited due to the lack of advanced technologies. The 
domestic defense industry can only produce low-tech supplies such as ammunition and 
small vessels while advanced maintenance needs to be outsourced in some levels (IHS 
Jane’s, 2013). 
Therefore, making partnerships in the defense industry sector seems to be a good 
opportunity for Thailand to improve not only its own capabilities but also its knowhow in 
defense technology. The policy of collaboration with friendly countries such as Sweden, 
the United States, Ukraine, and China helps Thailand to obtain advanced technology and 
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joint development from those countries during defense procurement. The top five 
countries from which Thailand imports its weapons and equipment are shown in Table 5.   
 
Country Value (USD billion) Percentage 
Sweden 1200 37% 
U.S. 620 19% 
Ukraine 515 16% 
UK 185 6% 
China 200 6% 
Source: SIPRI, IHS Jane’s, 2014  
Table 5.   Thailand’s Defense Imports during 2000‒2010. 
 
 
Figure 8.  Defense Spending as a Percentage of the GDP 1988‒2011 (from SIPRI, 
2013). 
However, the increasing percentage of defense spending since 2006 and the 
policy of self-reliant military suggest that the defense industry in Thailand still has a lot 
of opportunities for investment. Moreover, establishing the Defense Technology Institute 
to improve defense industrial capabilities suggests that the government realizes the 
significance of domestic production. Thus, the growth of defense industry trends will rise 
at a faster rate during the next decade.      
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E. ORGANIZATIONS IN DEFENSE PROCUREMENT AND THEIR ROLES 
In defense procurement process, there is no central procurement agency, but the 
National Security Council and the Defense Council play an important role in coordinating 
security policy and decision-making on general military policy and budget for the 
government. Furthermore, there are a couple major central agencies that oversee the 
defense procurement in more stages: 
• Comptroller General’s Department, established in 1890, monitors, 
controls, and administers public expenditure in order to ensure all 
government agencies comply with all rules and regulations related to 
public finances.  
• Office of the Auditor General, established 1932, examines the connection 
with the collection incomes of the audited agencies, the expenditure, and 
other properties as well as provides opinions on whether expenditure is in 
compliance with the regulations.  
In the decision-making process, Thailand’s defense procurement is divided into 
the following five levels and has a process involving user units, who are the military 
personnel, to Parliament according to the flowchart in Figure 8. 
• Three Armed services: Royal Thai Army (RTA), Royal Thai Navy (RTN), 
and Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) 
• Royal Thai Armed Forces Command Headquarters  
• Ministry of Defense  
• The Prime Minister and Cabinet 
• The Parliament 
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•  
Source: Arms Procurement Decision Making-Thailand (Singh, 1998) 
Figure 9.  Thailand’s Defense Procurement Structure in the Thai Armed Forces.  
F. LAWS AND REGULATIONS 
Major laws and regulations that are used in Thai defense procurement are 
following (Khoman, 2011): 
• The Regulation of the Office of the Prime Minister on Procurement B.E. 
2535 (1992), as amended number 7 in B.E. 2552 (2009)  
• The Regulation of the Office of the Prime Minister on Electronic 
Procurement B.E. 2549 (2006) 
• Act regarding public tendering offenses B.E. 2542 (1999  
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• The Regulation of the Audit Committee on Fiscal and Budgetary 
Discipline B.E. 2544 (2001)  
Although there are a lot of regulations involved in defense procurement, the 
Regulations of the Office of the Prime Minister on Procurement B.E. 2535 is the main 
regulations to which the armed forces refer. The methods of procurement vary by factors 
such as the value of the contract, the categories of products and the purchasing urgency. 
Six methods of tendering are specified according to the size of the contract, while the 
power of authorization in the special method and special case method has a different 
threshold limit from others (Khoman, 2011): 
• Negotiation is for contracts of less than 100,000 baht 
• Price searching is for contracts of 100,000 baht to 2 million baht 
• Open tendering is for contracts of more than 2 million baht  
• Open electronic tendering is for contracts of more than 2 million baht 
• Under 50 million baht: head of department 
• 50 – 100 million baht: Permanent Secretary 
• Over 100 million Baht: Minister 
• Special method is for uncertain conditions, such as urgency. 
• Under 25 million baht: head of department 
• 25 – 50 million Baht: Permanent Secretary 
• Over 50 million Baht: Minister: 
• Special case method is for direct contracts to government agencies  
• Head of department is able to approve without limit, with prior 
approval of the Prime Minister or Cabinet 
With regard to competition, these methods can be categorized into two groups:   
• Required competition: Price searching, open tendering and open 
electronic tendering 
• Not required competition: Negotiation, special method, and special case 
method   
In defense procurement, the special method and special case method are used 
most often as the value of a contract in arms procurement is likely massive and its need 
urgent, some of which must be approved by Cabinet. In 2009, for example, the Ministry 
of Defense used both the special method and special case method for 60.23% of its 
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procurements (Khoman, 2011). Although there is no competition when the special 
method and special case method are adopted, competitions are occurring within 
government agencies, the Ministry of Defense and during the procurement process before 
complying with the regulations in such methods. 
G. ACQUISITION STRATEGIES  
Recently, the Thai Armed Forces have an acquisition strategy in self-reliance 
based on R&D in terms of production, maintenance, and modernization. Military 
procurement also requires enhancing of defense industrial capabilities and knowledge for 
personnel. However, economic constraint is a major barrier for implementing the 
strategic plan, resulting in several delayed programs.  
1. The Defense Industry Strategy 
Since 2007, Thailand has had a strategy to develop local industries through the 
opportunity of defense business. However, although Thai Armed Forces have a strategy 
of self-reliance in the defense industry, implementing the strategic plans meets only the 
minimum requirements, not the optimally effective needs that the policy makers 
determine. The government focuses on importing arms from partner countries rather than 
efficiently using state-owned industrial facilities. Therefore, the military makes 
partnerships in the defense industry sector throughout the defense procurement in order to 
improve the technical expertise of its defense industrial capabilities. Partner countries 
such as the United States, China, and Sweden have a commitment to transfer advanced 
technology and joint development over the purchases as the collaboration policy.  
2. R&D Strategy 
The Thai Armed Forces have a strategy to increase R&D for military acquisition 
by cooperating with other government agencies and private sectors. Due to the budget 
constraint in R&D, services share knowledge with each other to develop their 
technologies. Insufficient R&D is the main obstruction for long-term development in 
acquisition. The country also does not have enough personnel with science and 
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technology skills, so improving manpower is the first priority that Thai armed forces is 
accelerating. Accordingly, MOD established the Defense Technology Institute (DTI) in 
2009 as a defense technology center offering solutions to the armed forces.    
3. Offset Strategy 
Thailand did not have a defense offset policy until DTI introduced one in 2012, 
and the offset agreement is likely to be in the defense procurement plan in 2014. MOD 
will set personnel education as the top priority when the offset is adopted.   
H. THAILAND’S DEFENSE PROCUREMENT PROCESS  
The Regulations of the Office of the Prime Minister on Procurement B.E. 2535 
(1992) provide only general procedures, so government agencies have to release their 
own practical, specific regulations, and guidance in accordance with laws and 
regulations. Thai armed forces have their own guidance for the defense procurement 
process. The process can be divided into six major phases: Program and Budget Request 
phase, Requirement Specification phase, Source Selection phase, Program Approval and 
Contract Administration phase, and Contract Management and Inspection phase. These 
phases are summarized accordingly:  
1. Program and Budget Request Phase 
User units propose required weapons and equipment by making program and 
budget plans in compliance with strategic priority, policy, and suitability. Committees 
must take technology maturity and logistical support alternatives into consideration under 
the determined budget.   
2. Requirement Specification Phase 
Staff Target, which is a primitive requirement, is determined when funding is 
available in a particular fiscal year. The effective requirement is clearly specified by an 
integrated committee in compliance with the Staff Requirement. Cost estimation is also 
conducted during this phase.    
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3. Source Selection Phase 
The request for proposal is documented and issued through the public to both the 
domestic and foreign defense industry. Solicitation allows the Source Selection 
Committee to receive proposals from qualified offerors. The acceptance proposal will be 
selected and declared to the public.    
4. Contract Award Phase 
When the defense procurement programs are approved for purchasing or hiring by 
a Cabinet’s decision, a procurement committee enacts the Special method or Special Case 
method to conduct the purchase. Due to the existence of competition during the Source 
Selection phase, which the armed forces use, their own measure within the MOD, 
Contract Award phase is a process of binding agreement. The finally selected firm is 
required to create contract activities.  
5. Procurement Approval and Contract Administration Phase 
The procurement contract will be approved and authorized after the contract is 
awarded. The post-award activities, including determining responsibility, preparing the 
award and signing contract, help make the contract lawful and more tangible. Contract 
administration ensures that the awarded contractor will comply with the conditions in the 
contract. 
6. Contract Management and Inspection Acceptance 
Contract management and inspection acceptance teams are formed after the 
contract is signed. These teams will manage, monitor, and control contractors and sub-
contractors for compliance with the details of the contract in terms of cost, performance 
and schedule, as well as report on the progress of the program to the armed forces.  
I. TRANSPARENCY IN THAILAND’S DEFENSE PROCUREMENT 
In 2013, Thailand received the lowest rank on Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) 
in its history since Transparency International proposed CPI. As shown in Figure 9, 
Thailand’s CPI rank decreased last year from 88 to 102 out of 177, which suggests that 
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corruption has been a serious problem for decades and has a tendency to become more 
severe. Some Thai people have a pessimistic attitude that corruption cannot be solved; 
some even think that they can accept corruption if they get some benefits from it. 
Therefore, corruption seems to be a problem that has become embedded in Thai culture. 
In Thailand, corruption is serious and has improved little in the last 15 
years. While corruption is widespread, it is particularly rampant in the 
business sector which is marked by especially large bribes. Thais are quite 
pessimistic about efforts to improve governance, and surveys show that 
they are especially concerned about dishonesty among the judiciary and 
police. (Lash, 2010) 
 
 
Figure 10.  CPI Ranking Trend of Thailand (from Transparency International, 2013c). 
Thailand does not fare any better on other non-governmental organizations’ 
assessments. According to the Government Defense Anti-Corruption Index, Thailand is 
placed in band D+, which means there are high risks of corruption in defense policy and 
budget. Transparency International also analyzed the risks as classified by five problem 
areas. 
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1. Political Risk 
Although the Parliamentary Military Commission inspects the defense policy and 
budget during the Parliament decision stage, this committee has no right to veto. They 
have the right merely to recommend further action for Parliament. Besides, it is difficult 
for the Members of Parliament to investigate the military budget as it is confidential and 
inaccessible. In the acquisition process, some programs cannot be transparent as stated in 
their plan because there is no serious anti-corruption strategy conducted by the 
government. The lack of an anti-corruption plan makes politicians and officials who 
engage in corruption exempt from any penalty. Therefore, Thailand needs sophisticated 
measures to cope with such serious problems. 
2. Finance Risk 
Even though there are explicit regulations and government agencies directing 
asset disposal, the process of disposal of military assets is not transparent because of the 
lack of detailed announcements to the public when assets are sold. This activity is subject 
to corruption if the public cannot scrutinize the funding from asset disposal. Also, there is 
evidence that a secret budget exists within the military budget. The secret budget is not 
specified for clear purposes, and it can be used without being inspected by the public. 
Finally, there are military-owned businesses such as banks and the Thai boxing business 
that make a lot of money from the military. There is no clear explanation about the use of 
this amount of money, which is managed by military. Some individual military personnel 
can take advantage of these businesses hidden behind military secrecy as the public 
cannot have access to military management. Therefore, there are a lot of hidden financial 
resources related to the military that the public should monitor.      
3. Personnel Risk 
Secrecy and lack of available information impede the National Anti-Corruption 
Commission from getting evidence of corruption even when corruption is found. 
Personnel recruitment and promotion are also subjective as the promotions board is 
composed of only military personnel at the top and middle level, and there is no standard 
assessment process in promotion or appointment. Political influence is usually involved 
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in top level promotions. Furthermore, only high-ranking officers receive anti-corruption 
training, but even then there is no regular training plan. So, it is unlikely corruption will 
be found. Even if fraud was discovered, the punishment for corruption is not stated 
clearly in the Code of Conduct.   
4. Operations Risk 
The doctrines and guidance of the armed forces do not cover corruption. Although 
there are general inspector departments and internal auditing departments in each of the 
armed forces intended to enhance transparency, the convictions they have won are not 
usually announced to the public. There is no monitoring of professionals or guidelines for 
deployment in the fields that are at high risk for corruption.   
5. Procurement Risk 
The procurement program in the military is directed by two main regulations, 
which are the Ministry of Defense’s Regulation on Procurement and the Prime Minister’s 
Regulation on Procurement. These regulations allow using a special method in case of 
secrecy or urgency. Unlike a normal method, the special method does not need to be 
announced to the public and the process is much shorter. Besides, the decision and 
rationale of the committees involved are not necessarily disclosed. Therefore, 
procurement is a highly risky area for corruption, especially in the unique areas such as 
offsets or sub-contracts.  
It is obvious that several risks are the result of military secrecy, which the public 
cannot investigate, particularly in defense procurement. Although there are general 
inspector departments and internal auditing departments in each of the armed forces, they 
are inadequate for transparency. Therefore, in order to improve the transparency of 
military procurement, military secrecy needs to be reduced to a level that allows the 
public and their elected representatives to examine the procurement process for 
corruption.   
Arms acquisitions in Thailand are still confidential and are known only to 
those who “need to know.” As the elected representatives do not belong to 
that privileged group and have no expertise on security affairs, the 
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situation is likely to continue. The first Thai White Paper was issued in 
1994, followed by a second in 1996. They give some details of military 
expenditure and define security policy and the role of the Thai armed 
forces in very broad terms. The level of detail is inadequate if compared 
with the Japanese and South Korean White Papers and, although it started 
as a confidence-building exercise, the Thai White Paper does not describe 
the arms procurement decision-making process. (Singh, 1998) 
J. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Throughout Thailand’s history, the military’s involvement in politics has helped 
the military to control budget allocation. Today, however, the Thai military seems to have 
less power than in the past. The public is more interested in monitoring and examining 
military expenditures, which are funded by taxes on the people in the country. Due to the 
lack of R&D and the limitations of the defense industry, Thailand has no capability to 
produce high-technology weapons, so defense procurement is used to solve the problem 
in the short term. However, inefficient procurement laws, regulations, and processes 
suggest that there are loopholes for corrupt people to exploit resources. Therefore, the 
military must be able to explain the rationale of its procurement program and make the 
procurement process transparent to the public. The transparency problems that currently 
exist are major barriers to success and an efficient defense procurement program. In order 
to improve the efficiency of its defense procurement program, the Thai military has to 
realize what the problem areas are in terms of transparency.     
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V. COMPARISON OF TRANSPARENCY IN DEFENSE 
PROCUREMENT OF TURKEY AND THAILAND 
Turkey’s rank on the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) has tended to improve 
since 2004, while the rank of Thailand has greatly decreased for almost ten years. In 
2013, the rank of Turkey rises from 54 to 53, but Thailand drops down from 88 to 102 
(Figure 11). This indicates that there are some factors driving the level of nations’ 
transparency in different directions. Although CPI shows the overall image of corruption 
of the countries, defense procurement itself has an impact on people’s corruption 
perception. This chapter analyzes the factors that are different in both countries. These 
factors include the quality of regulation, competition, power of military, and culture.  
 
Figure 11.  Thailand’s and Turkey CPI World Rank (from Transparency International, 
2013c) 
A. REGULATORY QUALITY  
Regulations are one of the best efforts that have a substantial effect on detecting 












government agents to exploit national resources without breaking any kind of regulations. 
Also complicated and vague regulations make it impossible to apply these regulations. 
Therefore, unethical government officials can use regulations in line with their personal 
interests. 
There are several regulations in Turkey for transparency in defense procurement. 
Until the enactment of Law 3238, only state-dominated firms were satisfying Turkish 
defense needs. The sole use of governmental sources in meeting defense needs is prone to 
corruption due to the government agents’ ability to hide behind the “governmental shield 
of secrecy.” Enacted in 1985, Law 3238 enabled private firms to take part in producing 
for the defense needs of Turkey. Thus, private firms started to force the government to 
open the blinds for both economic competition and transparency. Resolution number 
23378 not only expands Law 3238, but also gives details of the civilian integration in 
satisfying defense needs.  
Another law enacted to provide transparency is Law 4734. Law 4734, Public 
Procurement Law, aims to provide more information about public expenses. Enacted in 
2003, the Right to Information Law enabled citizens to access information on public 
spending and policy. In 2005 with the Law on Public Financial Management and Control, 
it became a requirement to present more detail on the defense budget to TGNA and to 
debate longer for the approval of the defense budget. 
Since 2010, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) has 
been conducting an assessment of the public procurement sector of countries with which 
EBRD has operations. According to its 2012 assessment report, Turkey placed second in 
the quality of its procurement laws among the Balkan countries, which can be seen in 
Figure 12. The 2012 assessment report also showed that Turkey has shown significant 
progress in regulating the pre-tendering process that is comprised of procurement 





Figure 12.  The Quality of Public Procurement Laws in Transition Countries in the 
EBRD Region (from Niewiadomska & Weiner, 2012). 
Another area of progress in Turkey’s public procurement is development of e-
procurement tools. Turkey is gradually adopting regulations and e-procurement tools to 
implement solutions for transparency. According to EBRD, Turkey has given importance 
to usage of e-tools, which are shown in dark red in the chart in Figure 13. Furthermore, 
Turkey has abandoned the conventional methods of procurement that are shown by light 
red bars in the chart. 
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 Figure 13.  The Implementation of e-Procurement in National Public Procurement 
Regulatory Framework (from Niewiadomska & Weiner, 2012). 
These regulations were helpful in transparency building and address the report of 
the European Counsel criticizing the lack of transparency in military spending. In 
addition, Turkey has not experienced a major case of corruption in defense procurement 
since then. 
As for Thailand’s regulation in defense procurement, the Regulation of the Office 
of the Prime Minister on Procurement B.E. 2535 is the primary law for government 
agencies have to enact when purchasing. Other regulations are used only for supporting 
the processes. The main regulation is not specific to defense procurement but widely 
states general criteria for government procurement, so agencies have to apply for specific 
contracts. In the Ministry of Defense, each armed force has its own regulation, and each 
is a bit different from the others in compliance with the Ministry of Defense’s guidance 
but still relates to procurement, as well as the main procurement regulation. As there is no 
central authority, interpreting and implementing the main regulation are practically 
different efforts, causing different procedures and standards in the procurement process. 
As a result, the decision-making process requires many detailed documents to make sure 
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the contracts are standardized and meet the regulation requirements. This bureaucratic 
stage makes the process cumbersome and less efficient.      
Like defense procurement in Turkey, Thailand’s procurement regulation 
strengthens the transparency in procurement by requiring announcements of the many 
stages to the public, such as qualification criteria and selection method. Minimizing 
secrecy prevents the procurement process from being manipulated by corrupt officials. 
However, even though the regulation encourages the armed forces to acquire weapons 
and equipment that are made within the country, the lack of high-technology armament 
production capabilities results in the inevitable import of arms from foreign countries. 
Due to the involvement of the foreign military industry, disclosing some information may 
affect the national security. Therefore, the Thai military is facing the dilemma of 
choosing to disclose information to be more transparent or being more secret but with 
more loopholes for corruption. 
B. LACK OF ECONOMIC COMPETITION 
Lack of economic competition can be seen as the biggest factor for corruption. 
When a government promotes competition for a certain project, offerors tend to lower 
their price to get the contract, resulting in receiving less profit. If there is competition, the 
possibility of corruption decreases as the offerors get a minimum amount of profit from 
submitting the best lowest offer. On the other hand, if there is a lack of competition, 
suppliers tend to submit higher price quotes to increase their amount of profit. This 
additional profit can be used as a bribe in exchange for a political favor. Immoral 
government officials can use this opportunity to gain some personal economic benefit.  
In Turkey until 1985, it would be wrong to say that there was enough competition 
to meet Turkish defense needs. Government-owned companies were the only source for 
military needs, which almost blocked any competition. With the enactment of Law 3238, 
this “lack of competition situation” came to an end. Also, Resolution number 23378 
clearly states that the “defense industry is open to both the foreign and the domestic 
sector.” By eliminating the competition problems, the Turkish defense industry cleared 
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the question marks in people’s minds about the transparency of any defense-related 
procurement projects. 
In Thailand, although there is competition, military secrecy has hampered fair 
competition among suppliers. In the defense procurement process, the most important 
competition occurs during the source selection phase taking place before the contract 
award. Each armed service has its own regulation for source selection, so the suppliers 
have to deal with different methods chosen by the source selection committee of each 
service. This causes a barrier for entry to the competition. Besides, unfair competition 
sometimes occurs when supplier companies have different access to information. Some 
companies are more advantaged when they can access an inside network, which provides 
them deeper information for competition. Others may use bribery or kickbacks to gain 
more hard-to-get information or may even pay for favored treatment from committees.   
C. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS: THE POWER OF THE MILITARY 
Civil-military relations also play an important role in transparency of military-
related activities. Countries in which the military has a significant influence over politics 
usually lack transparency in all activities that involve the military. In addition, broad 
public support and trust in the military helps militaries to avoid scrutiny of other 
governmental and civilian organizations. 
Until the last ten years, TAF had an important influence over politics. The main 
factors, which enabled the Turkish Army with political power, can be summarized as 
Turkey being a warrior nation, the Kurdish insurgency, and the significant trust and 
support of the Turkish people. In order to meet EU requirements, TGNA has passed 
several reforms that aim to strengthen civilian control over the military. In 2003, a 
seventh reform package came to life with the aim of limiting the role of military. The first 
impact of this package was the civilianization of National Security Council (MGK). 
Another impact was that MGK lost the power of unlimited access to all civilian 
organizations (European Commission, 2003). These regulations reduced the influence of 
TAF over politics and increased civilian involvement in military activities. 
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Similarly, in Thailand, due to 12 military coups since the Siamese Revolution in 
1932, the Thai military has a bad image in transparency and has gradually lost power. 
Whenever Thailand has had a military government, the defense expenditures usually 
increased as the military had power over politics and a lot of military projects were rarely 
inspected. Without effective scrutiny, much corruption occurred during military 
government rule. Recently, the power of the Thai military has been reduced because the 
Thai people are more educated and the public can access more information through 
media. Due to the GT200 project and current insurgency in the Southern Thailand, the 
military has lost public trust. Consequently, proposing a new project is difficult when the 
public has a question about transparency. Also, politicians have to investigate defense 
procurement more thoroughly during the decision-making process as it is in the public’s 
interest. The public does not hesitate to inspect when they find corruption in the military.  
D. STRATEGIC LOCATION AND THREATS 
Militaries symbolize the power of nations and they are effectively used in solving 
problems. The main responsibilities of armed forces are to protect security and integrity, 
and to provide deterrence. Armed forces need to be modernized and equipped with 
advanced systems to fight against any kind of threat. For this reason, the threats that a 
country faces play a significant role in its procurement process. 
Turkey is located at the strategic crossroads of Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and 
the Caucasus—in other words, at the heart of this century’s problematic area. In this 
problematic area, Turkey faces not only external, but also internal security threats such as 
the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, al-Qaeda, Turkish Hezbollah, and the Great Eastern 
Islamic Raiders’ Front. In order to provide security and protect secularism, TAF must be 
strong, modernized, and equipped with high-tech systems. Considering the security 
threats and the needs of TAF, TGNA has tried to meet every request that the military 
presents without questioning the underlying reasons for the needs. This “satisfy all needs 
mechanism” has prevented the military from oversight to some extent.  
But as a part of integration efforts to EU, reform packages and modernization 
made the oversight-free situation of Turkish Army a matter of history. Although the 
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military is still the most trusted institution for overcoming national threats, now all 
military transactions are subject to audit. In addition, enacted in 2005, the Law on Public 
Financial Management and Control requires that more information on defense budget be 
presented to TGNA and that the defense budget be debated for more time before 
approval. 
As for Thailand’s situation, it faces no obvious external threat, but internal 
security is focused on the Southern Thailand insurgency. Without a clear external threat, 
sometimes it is difficult to explain to the public the importance of developing the armed 
forces. When the military requests the defense procurement, there usually are inquiries 
from the public questioning whether it is necessary. Besides, the existing problem of the 
Southern Thailand insurgency makes Thai people suspicious of the efficiency and 
transparency of budget used in the area. The lack of trust from the public seems to be a 
barrier for defense procurement.   
However, Thailand is a member of Association of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEN), which consists of ten countries in South East Asia and is transitioning to the 
ASEN Economic Community in 2015. The region is being transformed into a single 
market and production base. Therefore, Thailand has to be involved in regional security, 
especially marine security, which is important for the regional economy. This 
combination of countries gives South East Asia more advantages in terms of defense 
industrial capabilities. The defense market will be more attractive for investors, resulting 
in the development of a robust defense industry. This will create an opportunity for 
Thailand to improve its transparency in defense procurement.   
E.  CULTURE 
As stated in the second chapter, culture (i.e., the level of generalized trust, 
importance of religion, and acceptance of hierarchy) is another player that affects the 
perception of transparency. Countries that are characterized as having a high level of 
hierarchy and low level of general trust are generally more prone to corruption than other 
countries. Also, a nation’s description of transparency and corruption is important to 
evaluate the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures. A particular action can be 
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accepted as a wrongdoing in one country, but in another country it is not. It is the culture 
that makes the difference in the perception of corruption. 
First of all, Turkey has long been known as a military nation, and every Turk is 
born a soldier. Furthermore, there is broad public support for TAF. This broad public 
support and trust stems not only from TAF’s great successes throughout history, but also 
from TAF’s standing as an intact and clean institution. There is no case of corruption 
known in the history of TAF. In Turkish culture, a young man going into military service 
is considered as becoming a “real man.” Successfully finishing military service means 
becoming an honorable person. In order to uphold this image of a “clean and sacred 
institution,” every military member is very sensitive to even his smallest actions. 
According to military codes, not only are bribes or any kind of corruption unacceptable, 
but also small faults that blemish the integrity of TAF are considered as wrongdoing and 
warrant punishment. Considering all these factors, there has been no request from the 
public about disclosure of defense procurement activities. 
In contrast, the military in Thailand is different when there is a military coup 
about every seven years on average. In Thai history, the military has tried to involve itself 
in politics by using non-democratic methods. Although the Thai people still respect the 
military as defenders of the nation, they realize that there has been corruption inside the 
armed forces. Even so, for a long time no one wanted to be involved in demanding 
scrutiny of defense procurement for fear of military retaliation. Recently, the military is 
less dominant in the society. People are more alert and suspicious when the armed forces 
propose a new procurement project. Many fraud cases were found when the public began 
questioning, such as the case of the GT200, which was started by suspicion from a public 
web board. However, from an optimistic point of view, the public is now playing a 
greater role in scrutiny and preventing corruption in the society. Obviously, the image of 
the military in terms of transparency is poor. Better transparency in defense procurement 
in Thailand, therefore, seems to be in the forefront of public interest. 
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VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This final chapter summarizes the problem areas in the defense procurement 
process and provides recommendations to make defense procurement more transparent 
and corruption free. 
A. SUMMARY 
Many characteristics learned from the fraud case discussed in this study suggest 
problem areas that can cause corruption. As defense procurement has a massive size and 
there are vulnerable stages in the process, it is attractive to corrupt officials and 
contractors who take advantage of loopholes. Inefficient laws and regulations cannot 
prevent such fraud. Lack of economic competition also leads to unfair practices and 
favoritism in exchange for dishonest benefits. Conflict of interest is one kind of 
corruption that can often be found in defense procurement. Due to the important role of 
the Ministry of Defense in national politics, political authorities always invoke the need 
for secrecy to protect national security, which makes defense procurement fraud one of 
the most difficult areas to investigate.  
Militaries are inevitably involved in politics to influence their defense budget and 
maintain their power position. Shielded behind secrecy, immoral military personnel may 
exploit national resources or military business because there is no efficient law and 
regulation against corruption. A lack of trained professionals actively tasked with 
preventing corruption is still a problem. However, efficient anti-corruption strategic plans 
and guidelines provide hope for defense procurement to become more transparent. The 
public interest can be an effective tool to prevent corruption when the public insists the 
military provide sufficient rationales before purchasing. 
There are two main questions that summarize this study, and they are reviewed in 




 1. What are the Main Problem Areas in the Defense Procurement  
  Process? 
Both defense procurement and public procurement have some common 
vulnerabilities, some of which are the lack of control and oversight, single sourcing, 
favored bidders, and political impact. However, due to the importance of defense for 
nations and the huge amounts of money transactions in defense acquisition, the defense 
procurement process has some extra corruption problem areas, including secrecy and 
other security measures that tend to limit the transparency of defense procurement. 
 2. How Effective are the Existing Anti-Corruption Tools to Fight against 
  Corruption in Defense Procurement? 
Although there are many anti-corruption tools aiming to provide transparency, 
their effectiveness is highly questionable. In fact, some of the anti-corruption tools can 
only begin to address the corruption problems, but cannot effectively solve them. 
The laws, regulations, and other conventions enacted to fight against corruption 
mainly address certain wrongdoings such as conflict of interest, bribery, and issues of 
competition. Nevertheless, they fail to address procurement actions, such as unnecessary 
and unfair requirements that are totally in accordance with laws but cause the needless 
expenditure of millions of dollars.  
As explained in previous chapters, TI assessment is based on the nations’ 
willingness to assess their corruption risks and transparency levels. In other words, the 
assessment is a voluntary tool that mainly consists of questionnaires. It detects problems 
in defense procurement; however, it does not contain any legally binding methods to fix 
the detected problems. 
B. CONCLUSION 
The defense sector always poses corruption risks due to the secrecy and huge 
amount of money outlaid on contracts. According to Transparency International, at least 
US$20 billion is wasted in the defense and security sectors because of the corrupt actions. 
National security concerns are used as a veil to hide the actual amount of money lost 
through corruption.  
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Corruption not only destroys trust in national security institutions, but also risks 
the lives of military personnel in the field. Arms bought in return for bribes sometimes do 
not work properly when needed in the field by soldiers, leaving them vulnerable to 
threats. 
Recently, there has been a rising trend for transparency in Turkey. Starting from 
the early 2000s, Turkey has been driving for transparency in defense policy, defense 
planning, and defense budgeting. In particular, reform packages that have been passed to 
meet the Copenhagen criteria mandated by the EU have reduced the influence of TAF on 
politics and increased transparency in TAF activities. However, the CPI ranking of 
Turkey does not show a vertical trend, which shows that there needs to be some other 
efforts for a more transparent Turkey. Although the defense sector requires some degree 
of secrecy, activities in the defense sector such as defense policy, defense budgeting, and 
procurement must be open to the public in order to reduce the possibility of corruption. 
Governments are not the only responsible figures in transparency building. Armed 
forces, the defense industry, and civil society must also take part in the fight against 
corruption. Considering the risk areas in defense procurement system of Turkey, there 
should be some actions and different measures to detect and prevent corruption. The 
range of the measures should vary from the institution of a single procurement agent to 
the politicians. 
On the other hand, the CPI ranking of Thailand shows a declining trend, which 
represents that there still remain some serious corruption risks in the defense procurement 
process of Thailand. In order to eliminate corruption and enhance transparency in the 
defense procurement process, the military has to realize the existing problem areas. As 
there have been many military coups, the military has been too much involved in politics. 
Political instability makes the implementation of a transparency policy difficult. The 
government cannot adopt serious anti-corruption plans or enact laws for enforcement 
effectively under such conditions. Moreover, secrecy in the military prevents inspection 
by the public and auditing agencies. It is easy for corrupt personnel to hide their own 
benefit behind secrecy. This can foster corruption when the public cannot access 
information that is not necessarily secret, especially in competitive processes. Vendors 
 73 
cannot access the same amount of information, resulting in gaps between competitors and 
in opportunities for bribery. Finally, the defense procurement process is currently based 
on bureaucracy rather than knowledge base due to the lack of R&D and offset strategies. 
This can cause transparency problems in the long term, when the military does not use 
scientific or justifiable rationales in their decision-making processes. However, it is a 
good sign that the public is more interested in the transparency of defense procurement. 
People in society are alert and monitoring the military. The military has to sincerely 
modernize its practices from policy to implementation. 
There are some factors that make the difference in both understanding and 
applying transparency in the defense procurement of Turkey and Thailand. These factors, 
which are quality of regulation, competition, power of the military, strategic location, and 
the culture, can affect procurement processes in a negative or corrupt fashion. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TURKEY 
1. Governmental Actions 
There should be a mechanism to analyze the corruption risk in defense and 
security institutions. This mechanism must also be responsible for developing a common 
understanding of integrity and corruption, and for coming up with remedies for 
wrongdoings. 
Some portion of the budgets of MOD and TAF is restricted from public access, 
and secrecy prevails on money-related activities. For this reason anti-secrecy should be 
seen as a main principle in defense procurement. In the case of significant issues, secrecy 
should be used as an exception. Defense budgets of governments should be published 
annually and defense budgets should be subject to oversight. 
An easily accessible code of conduct and proper anti-corruption training should 
be furnished to the procurement agents. 
All organizations that take part in the defense procurement process of Turkey 
should ensure that procurement decisions are based on strategic needs and are publicly 
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accessible. SSM should require bidding companies to ensure that subcontractors have 
anti-corruption mechanisms. 
Currently, Turkey lacks private military contractors. Therefore, Turkey should 
increase the number of private military contractors used in the defense procurement 
process to increase the benefits of contracting and to reduce any probability of 
wrongdoings.   
Whistleblowing is also a helpful hand in providing transparency. However, 
Turkey lacks any kind of a whistleblowing mechanism. Both civilian and governmental 
whistleblowing organizations should be established to provide feedback from the point-
of-view of an outsider. 
2. Legislative Actions 
Turkey should continue on reforms that enable defense and security institutions 
accountability and openness. There should be monitoring and overseeing mechanisms to 
control the actions of defense and security institutions.  
Most of the corruption cases, as we have shown, stem from limited public access 
to the procurement process and defense budgeting. In order to provide transparency for 
everything except highly important and secret projects, TGNA should pass laws enabling 
the public to access all procurement processes. 
3. Civil Society Actions 
Civil organizations can increase the role of civil society in the democratic process 
and can show ways to fight against corruption. Seminars, books, and published reports 
about corruption and transparency help society to drive for “clean” governments. TESEV 
should continue to organize seminars and publish policy papers, especially those focused 
on defense spending, to increase accountability and integrity. 
4. Executive Actions 
Secrecy is the biggest shield for corruption. Secrecy should not be used unless it 
is necessary for national security. Therefore, executives should provide recommendations 
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to legislators about the definition of classified actions and the situations in which to use 
secrecy.  
Auditing the defense expenditure is a good way to detect and prevent corruption. 
Although TGNA has passed several laws enabling civil auditors to audit military 
spending, there should be no exception that prevents auditors from evaluating the 
transactions of TAF.  
5. Audit Actions 
Auditors should take part in SSM and TGNA meetings to recommend necessary 
legislative actions, without which, opportunities exist for conducting corrupt actions.  
6. Leadership Actions 
Small-scale corruption activities can sometimes remain unnoticed. For this 
reason, small-scale corruption is more dangerous than large-scale corruption. It is the job 
of executives and procurement agents to detect, report, and take necessary actions in 
cases of this kind of corruption. 
Leaders should take more responsibility and active roles in the procurement 
process by conducting reviews and providing recommendations for procurement agents. 
Leaders should monitor the procurement personnel to prevent any of them from amassing 
too much power. People who have too much power are more prone to commit corrupt 
acts. 
Leaders should establish a 360-degree personnel appraisal to get some feedback, 
not only from superiors, but from peers and subordinates as well. The 360-degree 
appraisals will provide more thorough information to help prevent or detect any ethical 
problems in the organization. Periodic self-assessment mechanisms of the organization 
and practices should be established to keep up with the requirements of a rapidly 
changing world.   
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Leaders should ensure the flow of information in their organizations. Information 
sharing and communication should be some of the main features of the office 
environment in order to prevent “behind-door deals.” 
Source selection decisions and other information related with the contract should 
be transferred to bidders by web pages, bulletins, or other kinds of media to provide 
effective monitoring and feedback. 
As George Bernard Shaw said: “Success does not consist in never making 
mistakes, but in never making the same one a second time.” Previous case studies related 
to the procurement area should be analyzed in detail to learn from, and to apply learned 
lessons to our procurement organizations.  
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THAILAND 
1. Governmental Actions 
Anti-secrecy should be seen as a main principle in defense procurement. In the 
case of significant issues, secrecy should be used as an exception. Defense budgets of 
governments should be published annually and defense budgets should be subject to 
oversight. 
Governments should ensure that procurement decisions are based on strategic 
needs and are publicly accessible  
MOD should establish a central defense procurement agency so that all services 
will have the same standard and more bargaining power. 
Proper anti-corruption training should be furnished to the procurement agents. 
The military should be less involved in politics. The government should realize 
the importance of the military and provide sufficient budget to the military to ensure 
national security.    
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2. Legislative Actions 
In order to provide transparency for everything except highly important and secret 
projects, laws enabling the public to access all information related to the procurement 
process should be enacted. 
The main regulations should allow competition in every method and standardize 
the competition to be the same in every service.  
3. Civil Society Actions 
Civil organizations should take a more proactive role in increasing democracy and 
providing transparency in governmental institutions. Civil organizations should lobby the 
government of Thailand to announce spending levels for defense and other security 
institutions.  
4. Executive Actions 
Executives should provide a good example and clear policy in transparency as 
well as seriously implementing an effective anti-corruption plan without favoritism. 
Since secrecy is the protective shield for corrupt government agents, executives 
should take every possible action to fight against secrecy.  
5. Audit Actions 
An auditing agency should proactively investigate the defense procurement 
processes, not only in the final decision stage but also in each procurement stage 
throughout the process. However, bureaucratic auditing the process should not interrupt 
the effectiveness of the necessary defense procurement process.   
6. Leadership Actions 
Leaders should take more responsibility and active roles in the procurement 
process by conducting reviews and providing recommendations for procurement agents. 
Leaders should monitor the procurement personnel to prevent any of them from amassing 
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too much power. People who have too much power are more prone to committing corrupt 
acts. 
Personnel background must be checked to see whether they might have any 
history of corruption or lawlessness. Indeed, it does not ensure that people with clean 
backgrounds will stay clean throughout their careers; however, checks reduce the 
possibility of wrongdoing. 
Source selection decisions pose a great risk for defense public procurement. 
Therefore, source selection decisions should be provided by all procurement team 
members to select the most beneficial contract and to prevent any conflicts of personal 
interest. 
Defense procurement should be based on R&D so that there is enough 
professional knowledge and science background for making a decision in each stage.  
E. AREAS OF FURTHER RESEARCH 
Transparency International and other previously mentioned non-governmental 
organizations aim to fight very broad topics of corruption, varying from forestry to 
education. Although corruption in defense and security actions is stated as one of the 
topics of study, findings of the study do not address the specific defense procurement 
problems of the countries being studied. Furthermore, studies on defense procurement do 
not provide solid evidence of corruption. The studies are mainly comprised of 
questionnaires and the perceptions of people selected about transparency and corruption. 
For certain reasons, such as secrecy and international security, countries are not willing to 
share information on their activities related to defense and security procurement. This is a 
huge obstacle that blocks detailed investigations on the effectiveness of anti-corruption 
measures. 
A detailed and specific investigation into defense procurement is needed to 
understand the actual causes of corruption and to find effective solutions for providing 
transparency. Using published documents about awarded defense contracts, defense 
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spending, and defense budget-planning processes, instead of depending on questionnaires 
in the investigation, can provide more solid evidence of corruption. 
Additionally, pros and cons of single source contracts, offset arrangements, and e-
procurement should be specifically analyzed to acquire more effective means to fight 
against corruption. 
Finally, although there are comprehensive analyses of effectiveness of anti-
corruption measures used in sectors such as health and education, the defense 
procurement sector lacks this kind of analysis. An evaluation of the effectiveness of anti-
corruption tools can help to change current ineffective tools and replace them with more 
useful ones. 
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